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CURRENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS OF UKRAINIAN RETURN MIGRATION

Abstract

This article examines contemporary trends in Ukrainian external migration and the factors influencing return migration, underscoring the need for return policies that foster economic growth and social stability. The study identifies key determinants of return, considering both forced and rational migration drivers alongside the social profile of displaced persons. Particular attention is given to pull and push factors that either facilitate return or encourage an extended stay in host countries. The analysis is structured around two main dimensions – security and socio-economic conditions – providing an evaluation of the opportunities available in Ukraine and host states. Given the challenges related to return – including housing issues, economic uncertainty, labor market barriers, legal and bureaucratic constraints, and reintegration difficulties – the author underscores the need for a comprehensive return strategy. In particular, in collaboration with international organizations and civil society, Ukrainian government needs to implement policies that ensure safe return, access to housing, medical care, legal assistance, psychological support, financial programs, and educational opportunities for returnees. In this regard, the author emphasizes that information and communication campaigns about available opportunities can play a crucial role in facilitating sustained return.

Key Words: Contemporary Ukrainian migration, Return migration, Security risks, Social reintegration, Post-war reconstruction, European Union

Introduction

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 "resulted in one of the largest and fastest displacements in Europe since the Second World War"¹. In 2022, nearly 17

million Ukrainians crossed the state border, with more than 9,2 million returning home by spring 2023. Over time, the number of displaced persons abroad has gradually declined due to a significant share of returnees, primarily those who left Ukraine at

¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM). "World Migration Report 2024." <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2024>.

the beginning of the war. The Center for Economic Strategy (CES) reported that as of mid-2023, between 5,6 and 6,7 million Ukrainians² remained in European countries and other parts of the world due to the war. According to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from early 2025, about 6,4 million Ukrainian asylum seekers have been registered in Europe, with an additional 560 000 outside the EU³.

However, even now, it remains difficult to determine precise figures, as they continue to fluctuate. The specifics of recent Ukrainian migration, which complicate calculation methodologies and lead to variability in official migration data, include the challenge of determining whether returns are permanent or temporary⁴, as well as accounting for pendulum migration and the so-called “new wave” of rational or economic migration from relatively safe regions.

Since the security situation has been the primary driver of forced migration, at the outset of the war, most refugees initially intended to return. Among those who remain abroad, some are expected to return after the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, while preliminary data suggest that approximately 2 million Ukrainians⁵ will stay abroad permanently. Furthermore, considering the composition of migrant households –

particularly the high percentage of middle-aged women and children – the ongoing outflow of the population for family reunification cannot be ruled out. Particularly, the removal of the travel ban for conscripts may result in an additional 300 000-500 000 people leaving the country⁶, which will have significant implications for the demographic landscape.

The recent Ukrainian migration has already led to significant changes in domestic social and economic structure while also impacting the host countries. The economic impact of external migration should not be underestimated, particularly due to current labor shortages, and the heavy toll on the domestic economy from decreasing household spendings which affects economic growth. According to preliminary estimates, “depending on how many Ukrainians do not return home after the end of the war, economic losses due to the decline in production and consumption may range from

² Mykhailyshyna, Daria, Samoyliuk, Maksym, and Tomilina, Maria. “Refugees from Ukraine: Who Are They, How Many Are There, and How Can They Be Returned?” Analytical Note. Center for Economic Strategy, August 29, 2023. p. 6.

<https://ces.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/bizhenczi-z-ukraini.-finalnij-zvit.pdf>.

³ UN Refugee Agency Regional Bureau for Europe. “Ukraine Refugee Situation.” Last modified 20 March, 2025. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

⁴ International Organization for Migration mentions the difficulty to determine whether returns are permanent or temporary. For instance, in January 2023, due to the survey of all respondents currently in their place of habitual residence, 16% fall within the returnee definition (estimated 5,56 million returnees) because 80% of them indicate they are planning to remain in their homes (4,4

million), and 85% have been in their homes for a period longer than one month. See: International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ukraine. “Ukraine Returns Report – (16-23 January 2023).” <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-16-23-january-2023>.

⁵ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailyshyna, Daria, Samoyliuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

⁶ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailyshyna, Daria, Samoyliuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

2,6 to 7,7% of GDP per year”⁷. In addition, during and after the war it will be difficult to increase export-oriented production and develop more complex and technological production. One of the most critical aspects of ongoing migration is the continued outflow of highly qualified professionals in sectors such as healthcare, IT, and education. So, while it may be possible to fill less skilled

positions through external migration to Ukraine, addressing the consequences of the outflow of highly qualified professionals will be more challenging. In this regard, the development of sustained return policies that support economic growth and ensure social stability requires thorough consideration of migration drivers, trends, and consequences, both current and lasting.

Purpose and methodology

In the article, the concept of migration is outlined from the perspective of migration law. Thus, migration is defined as the movement of people for various purposes across the borders of certain territorial entities with the purpose of permanent or temporary change of residence⁸. Moreover, this population movement implies the change of place of residence for a more or less significant distance and duration is accompanied by socially significant economic, social, demographic and other consequences (positive and negative, overt or hidden, current or long-term, etc.)⁹. Forced migration is defined by the European Commission as “a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters,

famine or development projects)”¹⁰. In this regard, forced or involuntary migration should be interpreted based on the distinction between conflict-induced and disaster-induced displacement¹¹.

To study relevant migrant outflows, interpret their volume and prospects, and research their implications, it is essential to identify the variable factors influencing such migration and their relation to the social profile of displaced persons. In this regard, the most suitable approach for researching return migration is the push and pull factors theory developed by S. Stouffer. He argued that the number of individuals who migrate is directly related to pull factors and available opportunities while being inversely related to push factors, which include local legislation, access to information, the attitudes of the local population, and economic conditions.

When considering return, it is taken into account that the International Organization for Migration has defined returnees “as those

⁷ Mykhailshyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, and Tomilina, Maria. “Refugees from Ukraine: Who Are They, How Many Are There, and How Can They Be Returned?” Analytical Note. Center for Economic Strategy, August 29, 2023. p. 6. <https://ces.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/bizhenczi-z-ukraini.-finalnij-zvit.pdf>; Vinokurov, Yaroslav. “If Millions of Ukrainians Leave the Country Definitively, This Will Have a Significant Impact on the Economy.” Ukrainska Pravda, September 11, 2023. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2023/09/11/7419258/>.

⁸ Bezhlyi, Pavlo. “The Theoretical Foundations of Migration Process Research.” Political Life, 2018, no. 1: 5-13. <https://doi.org/10.31558/2519-2949.2018.1.1>.

⁹ Bezhlyi, Pavlo. “The Theoretical Foundations of Migration Process Research.” Political Life, 2018, no. 1: 5-13. <https://doi.org/10.31558/2519-2949.2018.1.1>.

¹⁰ European Commission. “Forced migration.” https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossary/glossary/forced-migration_en.

¹¹ Migration data portal. “Forced migration or displacement.” Last updated on 20 June 2024. <https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/forced-migration-or-displacement>.

who are currently in their place of habitual residence, who indicate they have returned following a minimum of 2 weeks in displacement due to the war (since February 2022)”¹². At the same time, the methodological significance for the research lies in the substantial role of pendular migration in the contemporary context, as well as the characteristics and controversies surrounding the phenomenon of temporary return.

This makes contemporary Ukrainian migration a compelling subject for academic research. Thus, the aim of this study is to

specify the factors influencing return migration, taking into account the transformed motivations for external migration, both forced and voluntary, as well as the social profile of displaced persons. Studying these factors will allow for consideration of the challenges that Ukraine may potentially face during post-war reconstruction, as well as the development of a return policy in light of the current and ongoing migrant outflow, relevant factors of the described trends, including conditions in the states that have accommodated the largest number of refugees.

Research findings and discussion

The most significant driver contributing to the mass influx of Ukrainians abroad at the onset of the full-scale invasion was the limited domestic infrastructure in the Central and Western regions of Ukraine to accommodate all refugees. Regarding the factors of relocation abroad, in 2022 the Info Sapiens organization provides the following data: 26% of respondents cited the conduct of hostilities or the bombing of their settlement as the reason for leaving (only 13% said that their settlement was relatively safe); 18% of respondents cited fighting near their settlement; shelling of settlement was mentioned by 25%; shelling of nearby settlements – by 13%; other factors (when settlement was safe) were mentioned by 13%¹³. At the same time, 38% of Ukrainians, believed that leaving Ukraine during the war was unacceptable. 35% of them didn’t want to leave family or partner. Difficult adapting to conditions in another country was named

by 18%, having physical disabilities or other restrictions – by 15%, 9% had to stay to keep a job. Lack of money was an obstacle for 24% of respondents, 22% convicted that it is enough to move within the borders of Ukraine to feel safe¹⁴.

The choice of destination made by people who left Ukraine was influenced by the following factors: the presence of friends, a partner, or acquaintances in the selected country (31%); family members residing there (27%); foreign friends or acquaintances from the host country (14%); availability of benefits for Ukrainians during the war (14%); the presence of a large Ukrainian diaspora (6%); knowledge of the local language or its similarity to Ukrainian (2%); employment opportunities (2%); geographical proximity to Ukraine (2%); relocation of a company that employing the respondents (2%); access to free or low-cost housing (1%); medical assistance (1%); and educational

¹² International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ukraine. “Ukraine Returns Report – (16-23 January 2023).” <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-16-23-january-2023>.

¹³ Info Sapiens. “80% of Refugees Are Satisfied with Living Conditions in Poland and Germany, but Only 62% Are Satisfied with Conditions in Italy.” June 1, 2022.

<https://www.sapiens.com.ua/ua/socpol-research-single-page?id=229>.

¹⁴ Info Sapiens. “80% of Refugees Are Satisfied with Living Conditions in Poland and Germany, but Only 62% Are Satisfied with Conditions in Italy.” June 1, 2022.

<https://www.sapiens.com.ua/ua/socpol-research-single-page?id=229>.

opportunities (1%). Additionally, 2% reported choosing their destination randomly. Despite the fact that the majority of Ukrainians moved to countries where they had existing social connections (friends, acquaintances, or relatives), 14% prioritized available benefits – this share was twice as high among refugees in Germany¹⁵.

Additionally, it's worth noting that the alignment of conditions in host states with the expectations of displaced persons led to certain shifts in their distribution within the European Union. In 2022, Poland accommodated the largest number of refugees. However, in 2024 the figures were as follows: Germany hosted 1,126 million of Ukrainians¹⁶, Poland – 957 000, Czech Republic – 373 000, Spain – 186 000, Italy – 169 000, the Netherlands – 136 000 and Slovakia – 113 000¹⁷. Outside the European Union, the largest countries in terms of the number of Ukrainians hosted since the beginning of the full-scale invasion are the USA (280 000 people), Great Britain (253 200) and Canada (210 200)¹⁸¹⁹. It is evident that these trends are largely connected to how effectively migrants' expectations are met,

particularly for those aiming to integrate into the host communities.

As sociological research shows, since the beginning of the war, the needs of refugees are largely shaped by household composition and socio-demographic features, as these factors influence their capacities and resources. In other words, both the specific needs and the factors driving migration decisions – such as the choice of a host country – are closely linked to the social status of displaced individuals and their region of origin. Generally, migrants mention access to healthcare and work opportunities in host countries as key factors influencing their intentions²⁰. Financial support (50%) and employment assistance (39%) were also the primary needs²¹. At the same time, significant share seek financial aid, while employment challenges were particularly prevalent among refugees from the East and South of Ukraine²². The proportion of refugees requiring assistance in the host country was lower among those without children (77%) and among those from Kyiv (76%) and Northern Ukraine (78%)²³.

On the whole, the distribution of refugees by region of origin remains

¹⁵ Info Sapiens. "80% of Refugees Are Satisfied with Living Conditions in Poland and Germany, but Only 62% Are Satisfied with Conditions in Italy." June 1, 2022. <https://www.sapiens.com.ua/ua/socpol-research-single-page?id=229>.

¹⁶ Nowadays Germany hosts the largest number of refugees in Europe: 7 % of all refugees in the world. See the data: International Organization for Migration (IOM). "World Migration Report 2024." <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2024>.

¹⁷ Bohdan, Tetiana. "The Status of Ukrainian Refugees in the EU Is Only for Three Years. What Next?" Economic Truth, January 12, 2024. <https://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2024/01/12/708597/>.

¹⁸ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Ukrainian Refugees: The Future Abroad and Plans for Return. Third Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 28, 2024. https://ces.org.ua/ukrainian_refugees_third_wave_research/.

¹⁹ Bohdan, Tetiana. "The Status of Ukrainian Refugees in the EU Is Only for Three Years. What Next?" Economic Truth, January

12, 2024. <https://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2024/01/12/708597/>.

²⁰ UN Refugee Agency Regional Bureau for Europe. "Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine." February 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

²¹ Info Sapiens. "80% of Refugees Are Satisfied with Living Conditions in Poland and Germany, but Only 62% Are Satisfied with Conditions in Italy." June 1, 2022. <https://www.sapiens.com.ua/ua/socpol-research-single-page?id=229>.

²² Info Sapiens. "80% of Refugees Are Satisfied with Living Conditions in Poland and Germany, but Only 62% Are Satisfied with Conditions in Italy." June 1, 2022. <https://www.sapiens.com.ua/ua/socpol-research-single-page?id=229>.

²³ Info Sapiens. "80% of Refugees Are Satisfied with Living Conditions in Poland and Germany, but Only 62% Are Satisfied with Conditions in Italy." June 1, 2022. <https://www.sapiens.com.ua/ua/socpol-research-single-page?id=229>.

relatively stable over time: there are no signs that the proportion of those fleeing from any particular region of Ukraine is increasing²⁴. According to the 2024 data, the majority of relocators are from the Northern and Eastern regions of Ukraine. Within specific administrative divisions, the top regions are Kyiv (18% of respondents), Kharkiv region (13,8%), and Donetsk region (9,5%)²⁵. Among those who were affected by the war, 43% still plan to return to Ukraine²⁶ (last year the vast majority refugees planning to eventually return indicated their return would happen “when the situation allows” when many of their places of origin are still being bombed, contaminated by landmines or in cases where their houses have been destroyed)²⁷.

The overall trends in intentions to return are as follows. According to the data of the all-Ukrainian nationally representative Omnibus survey, conducted in March 2022, only 12% of Ukrainians who went abroad due to the war at the time of the survey wanted or planned to reside there²⁸. In May 2022 57% of respondents reported their intention to return from abroad at the first opportunity, and 19% have not yet decided²⁹. As of

January 2023, due to the survey of IOM, of all respondents currently in their place of habitual residence, 16% fall within the returnee definition (estimated 5,56 million returnees)³⁰ (the difficulty in determining whether returns are permanent or temporary lies in the fact that 80% of them indicate they plan to remain in their home (4,4 million), and 85% have been in their homes for a period longer than one month)³¹. In February 2023, 12% of respondents reported plans to return permanently within the next three months. However, the majority viewed the situation in their places of origin in Ukraine as not conducive to ensuring a sustainable return home at that time. Overall, 65% expressed a desire to return to Ukraine one day, 18% remained undecided about returning in the mid- or long-term, and 5% had decided not to return³². According to the calculations of the CES, made in 2024, from 1,4 to 2,3 million Ukrainians may remain outside Ukraine under various scenarios³³. Specifically, data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, collected in April 2024, indicate that half of the Ukrainians

²⁴ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

²⁵ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

²⁶ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

²⁷ UN Refugee Agency Regional Bureau for Europe. “Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine.” February 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

²⁸ Info Sapiens. “80% of Refugees Are Satisfied with Living Conditions in Poland and Germany, but Only 62% Are Satisfied with Conditions in Italy.” June 1, 2022.

<https://www.sapiens.com.ua/ua/socpol-research-single-page?id=229>.

²⁹ Gradus Research Company. “Ukrainians Are Returning to Work and Home - A Survey.” May 2022.

https://www.gradus.app/documents/248/Ukrainians_returning_home_and_getting_back_to_work_IWZE4i.pdf.

³⁰ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ukraine. “Ukraine Returns Report – (16-23 January 2023).” <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-16-23-january-2023>.

³¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ukraine. “Ukraine Returns Report – (16-23 January 2023).” <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-16-23-january-2023>.

³² International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ukraine. “Ukraine Returns Report – (16-23 January 2023).” <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-16-23-january-2023>.

³³ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Ukrainian Refugees: The Future Abroad and Plans for Return. Third Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 28, 2024.

https://ces.org.ua/ukrainian_refugees_third_wave_research/.

residing in Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic are unlikely to return to Ukraine³⁴.

To determine the drivers of return, it is essential to take into account the full range of motivations for external migration. While the security factor initially driving forced migration largely determined the social profile of Ukrainian refugees (which has become a distinctive feature of contemporary Ukrainian migration, setting it apart from migration from other countries), over time, voluntary or rational migration has somewhat altered the social profile of Ukrainian refugees as well as their intentions to return. As of December 2024, women aged 35-44 made up 44% of all refugees abroad, which is 6 percentage points less than at the beginning of the year, when their share was 50%. At the same time, the share of adult men among refugees increased to 27%, which is 9 percentage points higher than in January 2024 (18%). At the beginning of 2024, children made up approximately a third of all refugees; by December, their share decreased from 32% to 29%³⁵. So, women and children still constitute the majority, but their ratios are experiencing notable changes.

Such a situation is related to what are considered as new waves of migration. After the wave of returns between May and September 2022 of those who left in February-March 2022, and the increase in displacements in the autumn of 2022 due to

intensified shelling of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, the next waves of Ukrainian migration were observed in the summer of 2023, autumn of 2023, and spring of 2024. In addition to the fact that these waves were primarily related to the escalation of the security situation, the lack of electricity due to Russian shelling, and a corresponding decrease in economic activity, in May 2024, a new mobilization law led to a situation where the number of people leaving Ukraine began to rise, while the number of returns decreased. As demographers mention, the "new wave of Ukrainian migration" contrasts with the spontaneous migration that occurred at the onset of the full-scale war³⁶. By 2024, "new migrants" are leaving Ukraine for professional development and improved financial conditions, being so-called new labor migrants, who seek to take advantage of simplified labor migration³⁷. In brief, the following clusters are outlined: war or «classical» refugees (middle-aged women with children) – 25%, for whom the return factor is security situation; "labor migrants" – 29%, for whom the return factor is labor conditions; individuals who have well-qualified job or business in Ukraine – 29%³⁸, and who is most likely to return³⁹.

When examining the factors influencing return, it is relevant to employ methodological approach for distinguishing between pull and push factors developed by

³⁴ Hrushetskyi, Anton. Survey of Ukrainian Refugees in Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic: Life Satisfaction Abroad, Return to Ukraine, Interest in the Situation in Ukraine. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. https://kiiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1408&page=1#_ftnref1.

³⁵ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailysyna, Daria, Samoyliuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

³⁶ Zanuda, Anastasiia. "Escape from War or Conscious Departure: How Migration from Ukraine Has Changed and What Its

Consequences Will Be." BBC Ukraine, October 16, 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c93px84133jo>.

³⁷ Zanuda, Anastasiia. "Escape from War or Conscious Departure: How Migration from Ukraine Has Changed and What Its Consequences Will Be." BBC Ukraine, October 16, 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c93px84133jo>.

³⁸ Lapa, Valentyna, and Bolotov, Vsevolod. "How the Ukrainian Government Works with Ukrainian Refugees." Ukrinform, April 14, 2024. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3851571-ak-ukrainskij-urad-pracue-z-ukrainskimi-bizencami.html>.

³⁹ Lapa, Valentyna, and Bolotov, Vsevolod. "How the Ukrainian Government Works with Ukrainian Refugees." Ukrinform, April 14, 2024. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3851571-ak-ukrainskij-urad-pracue-z-ukrainskimi-bizencami.html>.

S. Stouffer. This approach is already being applied to the study of contemporary Ukrainian return migration. I. Solohub presented the results of several regression models that illustrate the correlation between various factors influencing the return of Ukrainian migrants. Model 1 compares returnees residing in Ukraine with migrants remaining abroad. Thus, the author identified: a) demographic factors (such as single/unmarried individuals and those who emigrated with a spouse, etc.), b) pull factors (including a longing for family and home, the desire for children to study in Ukraine, better employment opportunities in Ukraine, availability of real estate in Ukraine, and information from the Ukrainian government, etc.), and c) push factors (e.g., financial difficulties experienced abroad). Model 2 compares migrants staying abroad who plan to return with those who are staying abroad and do not plan to return. The relevant drivers are: a) demographic factors (such as having planned to emigrate before the war, leaving in February-March 2022, holding refugee status, and not having visited Ukraine since February 2022); b) pull factors (including improvements in the security situation, longing for family and home, the desire for children to study in Ukraine, better employment opportunities in Ukraine, and the desire to participate in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine); and c) push factors (e.g., higher living standards abroad)⁴⁰. These findings can be enhanced

and further detailed with the following information.

As shown by IOM, the variations in refugees' intentions to return depend on their demographic profile, region of origin, household composition, the proximity of host countries to Ukraine, and the length of displacement⁴¹. A similar set of determinants is mentioned by the CES. Such factors are gender, age, marital status, education, country of residence, household composition, habitual region in Ukraine, current employment status and employment before the war, as well as current income level, and income level prior to the war⁴².

According to the data of UNHCR those hoping to return, in 2023 a higher proportion of displaced people was found among the following groups: households composed only by one adult with dependents (69%) (compared to those only composed by adults without dependents), households who were living in the South of Ukraine (71%) (compared to those from the West and Kyiv city (61-62%)), households hosted in countries neighbouring Ukraine (75%) (compared to those in other countries in Europe (59%))⁴³. In particular, Ukrainians currently residing in Poland are 90% more likely to wish to return than those in Germany⁴⁴.

An intention to return is more likely among older persons (they are more inclined to return to Ukraine: for each additional year

⁴⁰ Dubrovskyi, Volodymyr, Cherkashin, Vyacheslav, Vakhtova, Anna, and Hetman, Oleg. War Migrants: Global Experience and Ukrainian Particularities. Ukrainian Economic Platform, Kyiv, 2024. <https://iset-ua.org/images/Policy-war-migrants-final.pdf>.

⁴¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ukraine. "Ukraine Returns Report – (16-23 January 2023)." <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-16-23-january-2023>.

⁴² Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoyliuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

⁴³ UN Refugee Agency Regional Bureau for Europe. "Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine." February 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

⁴⁴ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoyliuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

of age, the likelihood of wanting to return increases by 3%⁴⁵), being undecided about return is more likely among those living alone and those with less proximity to their place of origin, no intention to return is more likely among “certain demographic groups, smaller households, males, young adults and/or with vocational or technical education)⁴⁶. Women are 31% more likely to wish to return to Ukraine than men⁴⁷. And no intention to return is more likely among those with specific displacement patterns (i.e. left during the first months of the war, originating from the North, hosted in countries not sharing a border with Ukraine and/or without spouse or children still there)⁴⁸.

The higher the pre-war income level, the more refugees are inclined to return (those with above-average income are nearly three times more likely to return than those with the lowest income)⁴⁹. And it is logical that Ukrainians who are still working remotely for a Ukrainian company are 67% more likely to return than those who are not working or looking for job⁵⁰. Generally, students and people who are actively looking for jobs are

less likely to return; but people with high incomes are more likely⁵¹.

There is somewhat contradictory data from surveys regarding the place of origin as a driver for return. According to CES, people who left cities are 41% less likely to wish to return than those who left villages⁵². IOM provides data indicating that a slight majority of returnees are residents of large cities (56%), or the suburbs of large cities (10%). However, relatively few families had returned to rural areas (7%)⁵³.

Consequently, in addition to the ongoing security risks in Ukraine and specific conditions in their regions of origin, refugees' intentions are mainly shaped by their access to basic needs and rights in host countries, as well as opportunities in the labor market, education, and integration into local communities. In light of the aforementioned, we are exploring the return factors in two dimensions: security and economic. In this regard, the logic of pull and push factors remains applicable, as it is important to evaluate these drivers by comparing the conditions that asylum seekers face in host countries with those in Ukraine.

⁴⁵ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

⁴⁶ UN Refugee Agency Regional Bureau for Europe. “Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine.” February 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

⁴⁷ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

⁴⁸ UN Refugee Agency Regional Bureau for Europe. “Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine.” February 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

⁴⁹ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad.

Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

⁵⁰ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

⁵¹ Bohdan, Tetiana. “The Status of Ukrainian Refugees in the EU Is Only for Three Years. What Next?” Economic Truth, January 12, 2024. <https://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2024/01/12/708597/>.

⁵² Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoilyuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_fourth_wave/.

⁵³ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ukraine. “Ukraine Returns Report – (16-23 January 2023).” <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-16-23-january-2023>.

The security dimension is unambiguous. For 33%, the possibility of obtaining or arranging housing in safe regions of Ukraine is key. 27% are ready to return if Ukraine's air defense is strengthened⁵⁴. Apart from the security factor, according to the survey conducted by *Info Sapiens*, respondents identified the following return factors: decent paid job in Ukraine – 28,3%, higher standard of living in Ukraine – 20,7%, restoration of infrastructure in home region – 17,7, end of the temporary asylum – 17,4%⁵⁵. However, security considerations, of course, remain the top priority. The following factors might encourage migrants to return mostly, i. e. end of the war – 51,2% respondents, absence of hostilities or air strikes in the territory of residence – 34,1%⁵⁶.

According to the data from the CES, while 47% cited security uncertainty in Ukraine as the reason for staying abroad, almost a third reported a lack of employment and means of subsistence in Ukraine⁵⁷. Every fifth person mentioned insufficient access to basic services (healthcare, water, electricity, infrastructure), and 15% pointed to the lack of access to quality education for children⁵⁸.

Therefore, in 2024 as a reason for returning to Ukraine, Ukrainians mentioned

the normal functioning of critical infrastructure (34%) and security (34%)⁵⁹. In May 2024, 26% stated the resolving of housing issue, as well as the end of a full-scale war by 26%. Slightly fewer respondents mentioned employment prospects (16%) and the arrangements for children to participate in school/kindergarten (13%)⁶⁰. For 36% of surveyed Ukrainian migrants, the availability of financial assistance in Ukraine at the time of return is important⁶¹.

This logic is also supported by the UN, which outlines such factors of return as security in the place of habitual residence, access to information about it; access to housing and basic services such as energy supply, healthcare, and education; opportunities to find a job. To specify, it should be noted that the most common reasons for the refugees' intention not to return are linked to the situation in their place of origin and their living conditions in the host countries. It is clear that the main reason is security concerns or temporary military occupation (almost 50% of respondents cited this reason). At the same time, among the main factors related to conditions in the place of origin, the respondents indicated lack of work (31%), lack of basic services (16%) or adequate housing (12%). Meanwhile, the

⁵⁴ Gradus Research Company. "Migration Intentions of Ukrainians in Ukraine and Abroad." July 2024. <https://gradus.app/uk/open-reports/migration-intentions-ukrainians-ukraine-and-abroad/>.

⁵⁵ Dubrovskyi, Volodymyr, Cherkashin, Vyacheslav, Vakhtova, Anna, and Hetman, Oleg. War Migrants: Global Experience and Ukrainian Particularities. Ukrainian Economic Platform, Kyiv, 2024. <https://iset-ua.org/images/Policy-war-migrant-final.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Dubrovskyi, Volodymyr, Cherkashin, Vyacheslav, Vakhtova, Anna, and Hetman, Oleg. War Migrants: Global Experience and Ukrainian Particularities. Ukrainian Economic Platform, Kyiv, 2024. <https://iset-ua.org/images/Policy-war-migrant-final.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Zanuda, Anastasiia. "Escape from War or Conscious Departure: How Migration from Ukraine Has Changed and What Its Consequences Will Be." BBC Ukraine, October 16, 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c93px84133jo>.

⁵⁸ Zanuda, Anastasiia. "Escape from War or Conscious Departure: How Migration from Ukraine Has Changed and What Its

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⁵⁹ Hrushetskyi, Anton. Survey of Ukrainian Refugees in Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic: Life Satisfaction Abroad, Return to Ukraine, Interest in the Situation in Ukraine. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1408&page=1#_ftnrefl.

⁶⁰ "Half of Ukrainian Refugees Are Ready to Return Home from Europe." Ukrinform, May 23, 2024. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3863614-polovina-ukrainskikh-bizenciv-gotovi-povernutsa-z-evropi-dodomu.html>.

⁶¹ Gradus Research Company. "Migration Intentions of Ukrainians in Ukraine and Abroad." July 2024. <https://gradus.app/uk/open-reports/migration-intentions-ukrainians-ukraine-and-abroad/>.

reasons related to the conditions of their stay in the host country are finding or having a stable job (19%), attending school (13%) and feeling integrated into the host community (11%)⁶².

Consequently, consolidating the information about the factors affecting residing in host countries, we emphasize that the choice for long-term stay often depends on covering material needs and possibilities of social integration into local community. In general, covering the needs of asylum seekers means access to a safe environment, rights and services; accessing social protection; access to healthcare; work opportunities; access to renting accommodation. Notably, in April 2024, 28% of Ukrainian refugees were completely satisfied with the conditions, 38% were rather satisfied⁶³. Overall, the concerns regarding host countries include the requirement to know the local language (28%), limited career opportunities (25%), the inability to overcome cultural differences (21%), and a reduction in financial assistance (20%)⁶⁴. Despite the fact that 53% of adult migrants found a job abroad, a lot of refugees from Ukraine, who are currently working, have low-skilled jobs and almost 30% say that their job abroad is less qualified than their job was in Ukraine⁶⁵. Additionally, we should not underestimate the role of public perception of migrants in host communities. Approximately 80% of refugees have a

positive view of the attitudes of locals. The best attitudes are found in countries with higher levels of ethnic and cultural diversity, such as Canada, the USA, and the United Kingdom. The highest levels of hostility in Germany, Poland, Czech Republic⁶⁶.

At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the conditions for asylum seekers from Ukraine are influenced by how interested the countries are in the influx of labor force and the increase in consumer demand. This, consequently, also determines the creation of job opportunities and access to education for Ukrainian migrants.

In other words, it is essential to recognize the impact of ongoing forced migration on the economies of European states. Along with the integration of migrants into the labor markets of various countries, it has generated a positive effect despite the increased financial burden on state budgets for their support. This phenomenon has contributed to the revival of national economies driven by increased consumer demand, job creation, and tax revenues from the activities of relocated individuals. This can be viewed as a highly beneficial factor for the integration of migrants into local communities. Economists emphasize that “if Ukrainians remain abroad, then European countries will receive a direct economic benefit; however, if they return, there will be an indirect benefit for the EU”⁶⁷. It’s worth to take into account

⁶² UN Refugee Agency Regional Bureau for Europe. “Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine.” February 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>.

⁶³ Hrushtskyi, Anton. Survey of Ukrainian Refugees in Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic: Life Satisfaction Abroad, Return to Ukraine, Interest in the Situation in Ukraine. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.

https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1408&page=1#_ftnref1.

⁶⁴ Gradus Research Company. “Migration Intentions of Ukrainians in Ukraine and Abroad.” July 2024.

<https://gradus.app/uk/open-reports/migration-intentions-ukrainians-ukraine-and-abroad/>.

⁶⁵ Sologoub I. Return or stay? What factors impact the decisions of Ukrainian refugees. – VoxUkraine, 16 January 2024. URL: voxukraine.org/en/return-or-stay-what-factors-impact-the-decisions-of-ukrainian-refugees.

⁶⁶ Vyshlinskyi, Hlib, Mykhailishyna, Daria, Samoyliuk, Maksym, Levchenko, Yeleazar, Myronenko, Olesandra, and Tomilina, Maria. Research Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research. Center for Economic Strategy, March 3, 2025. https://ces.org.ua/refugees_forth_wave/.

⁶⁷ Vinokurov Y. If millions of Ukrainians leave the country definitively, this will have a significant impact on the economy. How can Ukraine avoid the worst possible scenario? Ukrainska Pravda. 11 September 2023. URL: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2023/09/11/7419258/>.

that the largest group of Ukrainians in the EU are women aged 35-49. About 70% of them have higher education and lived in cities before the full-scale war⁶⁸. Consequently, some countries provide improved access to the labor market and offer professional-level language courses, simplify recognizing skills and qualifications, and create opportunities for professional advancement as well as provide school education. They also provide information and access to social services. Additionally, factors such as fostering favorable conditions for business growth, along with grants and project financing, are also beneficial for relocation.

For its part, the Ukrainian economy needs to mitigate the consequences of labor force outflow. First of all, we have to mention the decline in production and consumption and its effect on GDP. Business downsizing due to migration processes have had a significant impact on Ukraine's economic growth. In 2022, it fell by a record 30,4%, household spending decreased (that means a significantly larger amount of money needs to be redistributed through the state)⁶⁹. At the same time, economic losses are partially offset by remittances from migrants. These funds, which flow into Ukraine, are often used to cover living expenses, invest in education and healthcare, and support local businesses. Besides that, many refugees abroad spend money using the Ukrainian banking system⁷⁰. It is also important to consider certain opportunities, such as the

development of businesses related to servicing migrants.

Both internal and external migration has also affected the structure of the labor market in Ukraine. On the one hand, the outflow of highly qualified employees may lead to a shortage of professionals in certain sectors (such as healthcare, IT, and education). On the other hand, the decrease in the labor force may prompt increases in wages and improvements in working conditions for the remaining employees. Further risks are related to the outflow of highly qualified labor as well as the lack of workers. Among the significant consequences, it is worth noting the impact on the demographic structure of the population, as the majority of refugees are women and children. Additionally, attention has to be drawn to the emigration of youth, particularly in search of educational opportunities. In view of the aforementioned points, it is logical to highlight that migration has also exacerbated regional disparities.

Regarding the consequences of migration outflow and the motivations of potential returnees, it's worth examining the opportunities for stimulating the return. Due to IOM methodology, a return is considered "sustainable" if further migration is a matter of free decision – that is, the living conditions of migrants meet at least basic standards in terms of security, material conditions, healthcare, etc.⁷¹ Such conditions can be ensured through joint efforts by Ukrainian government, governments of those host

⁶⁸ Bohdan, Tetiana. "The Status of Ukrainian Refugees in the EU Is Only for Three Years. What Next?" Economic Truth, January 12, 2024.

<https://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2024/01/12/708597/>.

⁶⁹ Vinokurov, Yaroslav. "If Millions of Ukrainians Leave the Country Definitively, This Will Have a Significant Impact on the Economy." Ukrainska Pravda, September 11, 2023.

<https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2023/09/11/7419258/>.

⁷⁰ The scale of such expenses exceeded USD 1,5 billion per month and USD 5 billion per quarter in 2022. See: Vinokurov, Yaroslav.

"If Millions of Ukrainians Leave the Country Definitively, This Will Have a Significant Impact on the Economy." Ukrainska Pravda, September 11, 2023.

<https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2023/09/11/7419258/>.

⁷¹ Dubrovskyi, Volodymyr, Cherkashin, Vyacheslav, Vakhtova, Anna, and Hetman, Oleg. War Migrants: Global Experience and Ukrainian Particularities. Ukrainian Economic Platform, Kyiv, 2024. <https://iset-ua.org/images/Policy-war-migrants-final.pdf>.

countries which intend to reduce social costs, public sector, as well as international organizations. Certainly, the priority should be to provide housing for those Ukrainians who have been affected by military attacks. Considering that among those who are employed (45%)⁷², the majority have found lower-skilled jobs, such individuals are more likely to consider returning to Ukraine as a way to regain their status. Therefore, government programs for job search assistance and/or retraining (especially since there is now a shortage of labor in Ukraine in certain specialties) could serve as an incentive for return. Considering the demographic composition of migrants and the active integration of children into the school education systems of host countries, it is important to create conditions for the integration of school-age children and youth into the Ukrainian educational environment.

Concerning existing initiatives, the following can be noted. Since there are four factors that influence the decision to return – security, employment and the possibility of entrepreneurship, housing issues, and the quality of education – two of these issues can be addressed by the grant program “eRobota”, which helps Ukrainians start or develop their own businesses, get professional education, which can be obtained from the State Employment Service, and the “eOselya” program, which allows individuals to obtain a subsidized loan.

In this regard, various online services provide information on available support for returning to Ukraine, both from the state and from non-governmental organizations. So, in relation to technical perspective, it is worth noting “Ukrainian Refugee Response Learning Platform” which brings together

representatives from nine Caritas organizations in Eastern European countries – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Its main goal is to strengthen the capacity of local, regional, and national organizations to respond to the needs of displaced persons from Ukraine, as well as to promote their voluntary return. Another initiative is “The Return Home Platform” which was created to support citizens who wish to return to Ukraine as well.

At the same time, based on the available information, we can assume that the main challenges of return migration are related to housing issues, including difficulties in finding accommodation due to the destruction of infrastructure or increased demand. Additionally, economic uncertainty resulting from the destruction of infrastructure and businesses will play a crucial role by limiting job opportunities. This challenge could be compounded by a mismatch between the skills acquired abroad and the requirements of the labor market in Ukraine. Legal and bureaucratic barriers can also pose significant challenges. Furthermore, there may be a lack of support services, with an insufficient number of programs and resources available to help returnees adapt. Reintegration issues refer to difficulties in adapting to the social environment, including the restoration of social ties, and there is also the potential for social stigmatization of returnees.

To summarize, it should be noted that challenges faced by returnees, which the state should primarily address, are related to security risks, economic uncertainty and reintegration issues. To avoid feelings of isolation and frustration stemming from

⁷² Lapa, Valentyna, and Bolotov, Vsevolod. “How the Ukrainian Government Works with Ukrainian Refugees.” Ukrinform, April

14, 2024. <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3851571-ak-ukrainskij-urad-pracue-z-ukrainskimi-bizencami.html>.

difficulties in accessing social services, healthcare, and educational opportunities, it is crucial to provide returnees with mental

health support and counseling services, along with necessary resources, to facilitate the reintegration process.

Conclusions

The hostilities in Ukraine and the inability of domestic infrastructure to accommodate all refugees were the key drivers of the unprecedented external migration in early 2022. At the same time, the factors influencing displacement have evolved during the war, thereby shaping the variability of return dynamics.

While security was the primary driver of displacement abroad, other factors have gradually gained significance. As migration studies and opinion polls indicate, in addition to the safety situation in Ukraine, the intention of displaced persons to stay or leave their place of temporary residence is influenced by their demographic profiles, financial status, as well the attitude of host communities, access to the labor market, educational opportunities. Concerns regarding the conditions in host countries include language proficiency requirements, limited career opportunities, significant cultural differences, and reductions in financial assistance. Relevant circumstances faced by asylum seekers shape the prospects for social integration – whether temporary or long-term – for both those who intend to return to Ukraine after the security situation stabilizes and those seeking to settle permanently in their current place of residence. On the other hand, it is important to consider that the challenges faced by returnees involve security risks, economic uncertainty, and reintegration issues.

Since the socio-economic consequences of external migration are quite ambiguous, encouraging migrants to return to Ukraine will undoubtedly be one of the government's

priorities, requiring the involvement of international organizations as well as the public sector. Accordingly, a comprehensive set of measures should be developed, focusing on the needs of potential returnees, their social status, and demographic composition. In this regard, it is crucial to be aware that the main factors influencing the intention to return are largely shaped by the security situation, the implementation of reintegration programs for returnees, and the improvement of housing, employment, and educational opportunities.

Creating favorable conditions for the return that will contribute to the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine requires joint efforts by the Ukrainian government, public sector, and also international organizations. In particular, establishing partnerships with international and non-governmental organizations should also occur to secure resources and support return programs. The efforts of local communities and volunteer organizations will also be valuable. Establishing effective cooperation with EU countries is also essential to creating favorable conditions for returnees. This cooperation could include providing legal assistance abroad, supporting the post-war reconstruction of affected regions, opening access to the European labor market, and facilitating the reintegration of children and youth into the Ukrainian educational system.

Generally, it's essential to ensure a safe return and to develop a comprehensive return strategy with regard to the needs of returnees, providing housing, medical services, legal assistance, and psychological support. A

strong factor in encouraging sustained return may also be the implementation of financial programs, such as providing one-time payments upon return and access to loans for business recovery. Programs that offer vocational training and education for returnees will also be in demand to facilitate

their employment and social adaptation. In this regard, an effective information and communication campaign will play a crucial role in informing potential returnees about the conditions being established and the resources available.

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СУЧАСНІ ТЕНДЕНЦІЇ ТА ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ЗВОРОТНОЇ МІГРАЦІЇ

Анотація

У статті проаналізовано сучасні тенденції української зовнішньої міграції та чинники зворотної міграції, з акцентом на необхідності розробки політик повернення, спрямованих на зміцнення економічного розвитку та соціальної стабільності держави. У дослідженні виокремлено детермінанти рееміграції з урахуванням як спричинених війною, так і раціональних (економічних) факторів мобільності, а також соціально-демографічного профайлу переміщених осіб. Особливу увагу приділено зіставленню умов, які сприяють поверненню або стимулюють триваліше перебування у державах, що надали притулок. Аналітична рамка вибудувана навколо двох основних вимірів: безпекового та соціально-економічного, що дає змогу оцінити спектр можливостей, доступних в Україні та приймаючих країнах. З огляду на численні виклики, пов’язані з рееміграцією (пошкодження інфраструктури, економічну невизначеність, бар’єри на ринку праці, правові та бюрократичні обмеження, а також соціально-психологічні труднощі реінтеграції), авторка наголошує на необхідності комплексної стратегії повернення. Зокрема, доцільним є впровадження українським урядом – у співпраці з міжнародними організаціями та громадянським суспільством – політик, що забезпечують безпеку, доступ до житла, медичну допомогу, правову та психологічну підтримку, а також передбачають реалізацію фінансових програм та освітніх можливостей для осіб, які повертаються. У цьому контексті підкреслено важому роль інформаційних та комунікаційних кампаній щодо доступних можливостей, спрямованих на забезпечення сталого повернення та реінтеграції.

Ключові слова: сучасна українська міграція, зворотна міграція, безпекові ризики, соціальна інтеграція, повоєнна відбудова, Європейський Союз



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