Corrupting or Stabilizing: The Political Economy of Corruption in Donbas’s “People’s Republics”
A wide range of normative implications exists between corruption and the stability of de-facto states. While some claim that corruption inherently disrupts institutional development and stumps economic growth, others argue that corruption in some cases acts as a stabilizing factor for authoritarian regimes. Regardless, corruption generally plays a role in the political economy of any state. In de-facto states, corruption tends to play an outsized role, either or equally impacting the exercise of political authority or the allocation of public goods and services. This research aims to examine the case study of the Luhansk and Donetsk “People’s Republics” and the relationship between corruption and governance in these two de-facto regions to better understand how corruption and stability are interrelated. Methodologically, I plan to use mostly political economy methods, namely focusing on using Goodhand’s framework of analyzing different economies during conflict. I will rely mostly on open-source information for this preliminary research to determine what the governance structure is, namely focusing on the DPR’s and the LPR’s respective governments.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal
National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
2 Skovoroda St., Kyiv 04070, Ukraine
This journal is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License