Franck’s Right to Democratic Governance and the Role of Democratic Sanctions

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18523/kmlpj153257.2018-4.137-157

Keywords:

democratic sanctions, democracy, the democracy norm, democratic legitimacy, government’s legitimacy

Abstract

In 1992, Tomas Franck conceptualized the democratic entitlement theory — a new approach regarding the international validation of governance, which was previously based solely on the “doctrine of effective control.” This led to the emergence of a new international norm under which only democracy can validate a government’s legitimacy. Twenty years later, the theory proposed by Franck has gained more currency. International organizations and states began and continue to address the legitimacy of a government by imposing democratic sanctions. This article proposes to corroborate the Franck democratic entitlement theory by incorporating democratic sanctions, while also consolidating cases where sanctions were applied, inter alia, construing legal status of such measures.

Author Biography

Bohdan Bernatskyi, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Department of International and European Law

Bohdan Bernatskyi is completing his PhD (International Law)  on prohibition of political parties at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. In 2015, he obtained master’s degree in international law at the Institute of International Relations, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. His professional areas of interest are democracy in international law, comparative constitutionalism, political rights, sanctions, and others. He is an author of several publications on deprivation of the right to vote and on the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on ban the Communist party of Ukraine.

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Published

2018-12-27

How to Cite

Bernatskyi, B. (2018). Franck’s Right to Democratic Governance and the Role of Democratic Sanctions. Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, (4), 137–157. https://doi.org/10.18523/kmlpj153257.2018-4.137-157

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Articles