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## Collective and Personal Representations of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian Media Discourse: Ideological Implications and Power Relations

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# Collective and Personal Representations of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian Media Discourse: Ideological Implications and Power Relations

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## Abstract

This study analyzes the Ukrainian national and Crimean media's collective and individual representations of the Crimean Tatar people during 2010–2012. It demonstrates that this media's discourse was a sensitive milieu that reflected the unequal power relations between Crimea's ethnic groups — the Crimean Tatar minority and the Slavic majority — and informed the way individuals constructed their identities and social roles within Crimean society. The discursive mechanisms of the media's representations of the Crimean Tatars often included indirect and subtle forms of social exclusion. They also used references to common sense and ethnic markers to juxtapose the positive “Self”-image and the negative image of the “Other.” To portray the Crimean Tatars as a group that potentially threatens the social order, the media built a discourse of “the unsatisfied” around the group and its individual representatives.

**Key Words:** media discourse, power relations, social exclusion, collective identity, interethnic relations.



## Introduction

The timeframe of this study's research — 2010 through 2012 — is critically important because of its proximity to the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014. Thus, this study's research into the all-Ukrainian and Crimean mainstream media's patterns of representing the Crimean Tatars and their key discursive strategies for constructing the Crimean Tatars' collective and individual identities and ideologies immediately preceded the Russian Federation's actions.

By examining the degree of social exclusion or inclusion in the media discourse about the Crimean Tatars at the national and Crimean levels, this study uncovers the concrete discursive mechanisms in which unequal power distribution between the Slavic majority and Crimea's ethnic minorities is manifested. I argue that this media discourse reflects a continuous attempt to establish and maintain the dominance of Soviet-molded history, the prevalence of the Russian language, and the political hegemony of the Slavic, pro-Russian groups in Crimea. These forces shape the ways in which media represents group identities and builds relations of dominance and subordination between them.

Grounding my conclusions on a critical discourse analysis of the corpus of media texts during this period, I argue that during the years before the Russian annexation, the Crimean and the Ukrainian media generally tended to decrease their use of overt forms of hate speech and derogatory and discriminatory rhetoric regarding ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, many Crimean media experts argue that, despite the overall trend towards tolerance and inclusivity of the media discourse, the situation is much more complicated, pointing to the existence of hidden agendas promoted by the key political subjects of the peninsular and profound differences in world views internalized by various groups residing in Crimea. My analysis also revealed a contest between the adherents of the opposing post-Soviet and Ukrainian national-democratic ideological frames, different versions of the collective memory of the World War II and other features of the media discourse that pointed to an ongoing conflict smoldering in the region before the pro-Russian political interference escalated in early 2014.

### Theoretical Framework

This study's central concept is discourse. In this study, I will focus on a particular set of definitions of discourse, pointing out approaches that could be united by considering discourse to be their central and basic conceptual premise. All of the definitions of discourse within the given scientific field can be divided into two major groups: definitions that refer to the linguistic nature of discourse and definitions that point out social interaction as a basic feature of discourse. From among these multiple definitions of discourse, I will pinpoint those that emphasize social communication as an influential tool of a power struggle within a society.

David Howarth provides a more detailed definition of discourse. He sees discourse as a concrete system of social relations and practices that are initially political, as the system involves constructing antagonisms, using power and drawing political frontiers between “insiders” and “outsiders.”<sup>1</sup> Thus, Howarth steps away from the linguistic approach to discourse by emphasizing its social nature and key processes.

Myra MacDonald integrates discourse as a “system of communicative practices”<sup>2</sup> into a wider set of social and cultural practices that construct specific frameworks of thinking, thus pinpointing the cognitive function of discourse. In addition to the cognitive function, discourse is also closely interwoven into the social structures of society. In the interaction between discourse and social practices, social continuity and change is achieved, Norman Fairclough argues. Therefore, control over discourse and its structures (or orders) allows power holders to preserve their dominant position and can become a space for contesting power relations.<sup>3</sup> In addition, Fairclough describes discourse as “a way to represent aspects of the world — processes, relations and structure or mental world [...] thoughts, feelings and beliefs.”<sup>4</sup> This

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1 David Howarth, *Discourse* (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 9.

2 Myra MacDonald, *Exploring Media Discourse* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2003), 10.

3 Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (Edinburgh: Longman, 1989), 37.

4 Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London: Routledge, 2003), 124.

means that discourse also informs the shape and essence of social identities, as well as the meanings of events and collective beliefs about a society and its institutions.

The notion of social identity and the discursive patterns of its construction are among the crucial theoretical concepts used in this study. According to Karina Korostelina, social identity can be defined as a set of “internalized rules, expectations and norms connected to specific social roles.”<sup>5</sup> Thus, the discursive construction of collective and individual identities does more than reflect the current social reality and ongoing power struggles between the political and ethnic groups. It also greatly influences the way individuals see their own role in the society, defines their feeling of belonging to certain groups and their relations between or among group members.

Fairclough and van Dijk focus heavily on the ideological impact of discourse and on the process of negotiating social identities in discourse. As Fairclough points out, ideology plays a crucial role in building these intergroup relations. By “ideology,” Fairclough means “institutional practices, which embody assumptions which in turn directly or indirectly legitimize existing power relations.”<sup>6</sup> Ideology, Fairclough adds, can directly or indirectly legitimize existing power relations by sustaining the social practices of domination. Van Dijk argues that a crucial role of ideology is “to sustain, legitimize and manage group conflicts.”<sup>7</sup>

Representation of social actors or subjects in the discourse derives from the general statement that discourse reflects (and influences) relevant social practices, which, of course, are derived from the behavior of a number of actors. Active or passive, collective or individual, the subject positions of these actors inform the ways they are represented in the discourse about these practices. The analysis of these subject positions in the discourse usually involves examining the major patterns of group naming, collective and individual agency of social actors as well as mechanisms of personal representations of the group members. The agency of social actors in the various media outlets can vary. By “agency of social actors” in the discourse, I mean the various contexts in which social actors are either represented as central actors or represented in the forms where the subjects of the action are either passivized, completely eliminated or suppressed to the background.<sup>8</sup>

Teun A. van Dijk stated that “discourse forms the group,”<sup>9</sup> meaning that collective identities are constructed in discursive acts. However, Volodymyr Kulyk<sup>10</sup> points out that a single discursive act does not fix the manifested identification. Only the systematic repetition of the

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5 Karina Korostelina, *Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics and Implications* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 21.

6 Fairclough, *Language and Power*, 33.

7 T. A. van Dijk, *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (London: Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 1998), 24.

8 See Norman Fairclough, *Media Discourse* (London: Hodder Arnold, 1995) and T. van Leeuwen, “Representation of Social Actors,” in *Texts and Practices. Readings on Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. C. Caldas-Courthald and M. Coulthard (London: Routledge, 1996), 32–71.

9 Van Dijk, *Ideology*, 125.

10 Volodymyr Kulyk, *Dyskurs ukraiinskykh medii: Identychnosti, ideolohii, vladni stosunky* [*The Ukrainian Media Discourse: Identities, Ideologies, Power Relations*] (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2010).

manifested discursive role assigns this type of behavior to a certain individual or group, molding the identity as a more or less stable characteristic. In this regard, media discourse is a social milieu through which the voices of the various social groups are channeled and their respective views are promoted on a regular basis.

One of the most important features of media discourse, the news discourse, is that it does not only describe events; it also actively constructs them. As van Dijk argues, there are many factors influencing this process: production routines, the values behind these routines, corporate interests infiltrated into the news by the media owners, professional ideologies and standards, and media formats and genres. These and many other features influence the way media report the social reality.

Regardless of the journalistic standards of impartiality and balance, the voices of the majority groups or the power holders are conventionally provided more space in the media discourse, Fairclough states. By “voices,” I mean the representation of collective or individual speakers, who speak for themselves in the media or whose speech is reported.<sup>11</sup> Jan Blommaert defines voice as “a capacity to accomplish the desired function through the language, a capacity to make oneself understood.”<sup>12</sup> But this capacity, he claims, is not self-evident. It depends primarily on the possibility to access what he calls the order of indexicality, the norms and rules of language that are produced systemically and are often related to social inequality.<sup>13</sup>

Voice in media discourse can be identified with a particular social actor, anonymous or not disclosed. The strict boundaries between the reporting discourse (the one maintained by a journalist) and the reported discourse (the one of a speaker) are defined by using quotations and direct speech. The use of quotes gives the audience a witness to the events the media is talking about, thus giving the news more credibility. On the other hand, the reported speech, the news without quotations of the speakers, can shift the emphasis and blur the original speaker’s position.

As Fairclough argues, even when speech is quoted, the power relations between the key subjects of the discourse are in play. There is a hierarchy of voices — some voices are given prominence, placed in the lead of the news, while other voices are marginalized and placed at the bottom of the text.<sup>14</sup>

Norman Fairclough distinguished between four levels of information presentation in the text:

- 1) foreground — present and emphasized information, presented as primary;
- 2) background — explicitly stated but un-emphasized information;
- 3) presupposed information, which suggests meaning within the given context;
- 4) absent information — relevant information which is not mentioned in the news.<sup>15</sup>

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11 Norman Fairclough, *Media Discourse* (London: Hodder Arnold, 1995), 80.

12 Jan Blommaert, *Discourse* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 68.

13 Blommaert, *Discourse*, 73.

14 Fairclough, *Media Discourse*, 81.

15 Cited in Riggins Stephen, “The Rhetoric of Othering,” in *Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse*, ed. S. Riggins (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 9.

There is no direct correspondence between the use of a quotation and a reported speech and the foregrounding and backgrounding of the information. The foregrounded utterance can often be presented as reported speech and the information in the background can be quoted.

Omitting something is a common instrument for framing information. Of course, as every position and fact cannot be presented within the limited framework of media texts, certain information is always excluded.<sup>16</sup> However, silencing or omission can also be an efficient discursive strategy for exclusion, as it is, for instance, in the systematic absence of the voice of the minority ethnic group in media discourse.

The further analysis of the media texts relies on research questions offered by Reisigl and Wodak.<sup>17</sup> They propose these questions as relevant to an analysis of the exclusion or inclusion of social actors:

- 1) How the persons are named and referred to linguistically?
- 2) What traits and characteristics are attributed to them?
- 3) By what arguments individuals' and groups' inclusion or exclusion is being legitimized?
- 4) From what point of view are these arguments expressed?
- 5) Are respective utterances expressed overtly or are they mitigated?

Each of these questions is connected with a certain discursive strategy of "positive self-representation and negative other-representation," the authors state. As to the meaning of "strategy," van Dijk defines the "strategy" of exclusion/inclusion as "a process of perception, interpretation, storage, use of ethnic information about minority groups and their actions."<sup>18</sup> Krzyzanowski and Wodak explain that the investigation of discursive strategies involves the study of the typical schemes of argumentation as well as deconstruction of the linguistic means for realizing these strategies.<sup>19</sup>

The strategies proposed by Krzyzanowski and Wodak are the following:

- 1) nominalization, which is a construction of in- and out-groups;
- 2) predication, which is labeling social groups in a positive or negative way;
- 3) argumentation, which is a strategy aimed at justifying positive or negative attributions; and
- 4) framing or discourse representation targeted at positioning a speaker's point of view by means of reporting, narration or quotation of the described events with either the intensification or mitigation of the discriminatory utterances.<sup>20</sup>

In the analysis of the agency of the Crimean Tatars, I will distinguish between the two main forms of agency: the representation of the individuals or groups as either patients or agents.

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16 J. Street, *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

17 M. Reisigl and R. Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination, Rhetoric of Racism and Anti-Semitism* (London: Routledge, 2001).

18 Van Dijk T. A., "Contextual Knowledge Management in Discourse Production. A CDA Perspective," in *A New Research Agenda in CDA: Theory and Multidisciplinarity*, eds. R. Wodak and P. Chilton (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2005), 8.

19 M. Krzyzanowski and R. Wodak, *The Politics of Exclusion* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 21–22.

20 Krzyzanowski and Wodak, *The Politics of Exclusion*, 23.



Fairclough explains this referring to patients as people who are not doing the action themselves but are being affected by the actions of others or are participants in more broad processes that they cannot influence directly<sup>21</sup>. In both the individual and collective representation of the Crimean Tatars, their agency can be different, depending on the topic, media format and ideological stance of the media outlet.

### The Structure of this Study's Analysis

In order to explore the patterns of representation of the Crimean Tatars' collective and individual identities in the media discourse, I chose to use the methodological means of critical discourse analysis to analyze the corpus of the media texts on a selective list of the all-national and Crimean mainstream printed and online media.

The media texts used in the analysis consist of 700 relevant media materials published from 2010 through 2012 in the following national media outlets: daily newspapers "Ukraina Moloda" and "Segodnia"; weekly newspapers "Komentari" and "Dzerkalo Tyzhnia," as well as weekly magazines "Korrespondent" and "Fokus"; and the top-rated internet news edition "Ukrainska Pravda." Among the Crimean media outlets I included are media texts of the same timeframe published in three popular media outlets: "Krymskie Izvestiia" and "Krymskii Telegraf" daily newspaper and "1 Krymskaia" weekly.

The criteria of inclusion of the media texts into the research sample were the following:

- 1) the media texts that are fully or partly dedicated to the various issues in the Crimean Tatars' political, social, cultural life, as well as their history and traditions;
- 2) the media texts that touch upon the aspects of the Crimean Tatars' affairs among other issues of general interest mentioned in the text;
- 3) the media texts that contain relevant group or individual naming of the Crimean Tatar people and their representatives provided in various contexts in the media text which are not necessarily dedicated to the Crimean Tatars' topics.

In the rare cases of uncertainty, I decided what to include in the sample based on my experience.

The total number of the media materials in the sample of the national media is 287, which includes 103 texts from 2010, 91 from the 2011 and 93 from 2012. The number of the media materials in the sample of the Crimean mainstream media is 413, which includes 122 media texts in 2010, 134 — in 2011 and 157 — in 2012.

A quantitative analysis of the sample of media materials allows for identifying the most commonly used media genres within the analyzed sample. As Richardson states, discursive genre is "a product of a constellation of discursive practices" that was created in accordance with particular production techniques in specific institutional settings."<sup>22</sup> Therefore, genres can be approached in terms of their organizational properties and the structure they bring to the particular piece of text at various levels. According to Fairclough, genres provide sets of more or

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21 Fairclough, *Media Discourse*, 112.

22 John Richardson, *Analyzing Newspapers* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 76.

less fixed conventions within the linguistic tools to represent an issue or to report news.<sup>23</sup> In this sense the term “genre” is similar to the term “media format,” which also implies certain schemes, structures and stylistics characteristics, the use of which leads to facilitation (and routinization) of news production and consumption.

The sample of media texts compiled for the current study includes texts of various genres: news, analytical articles, interviews, feature stories, commentaries and other types.

Despite the variety of genres present in Ukrainian media, the study of the selected corpus of media texts showed that news and analytical articles are the most frequently used genres in the media discourse on the Crimean Tatars. During the study’s timeframe, in the selected pool of the national media outlets there were 140 pieces of news related to the Crimean Tatars, which was around 50% of all media materials published during the period. In the Crimean media sample, this figure is lower — around 37%.

Various types of media outlets have their own generic patterns for the production of media content. For instance, “Ukrainska Pravda,” the all-Ukrainian Internet media, published 71% of its information about the Crimean Tatars in the genre of news, which is one of the typical genres for this internet media. At the same time, national political-economic weekly “Komentari,” which focuses mainly on the analytical format, published one third (25 out of 75) of all analytical materials on the matter at the national level during three years. The Crimean press also has its own special features. In the Crimean daily “Krymskie Izvestiia” analytical materials make up only 2.3% of all texts, while in “1 Krymskaia” weekly this figure is 28%. Analytical articles and interviews in the national and Crimean sample are at a similar level: pieces of analytics make up 26% and interviews — 4% at the national level, and 25% and 4% — at the Crimean level, respectively.

Genre is an important tool for the construction of collective and personal representations in the media discourse. Various types of genres frame the reported events from the social reality in different ways and, therefore, exercise different impacts on the media audiences. News — the most commonly used type of media genre — is a short, laconic and simple piece of text that reports on current events. Anthony Riggins admits that target audience considers the news more bias-free and more reliable than other types of media output.<sup>24</sup>

As to personal representations, news, interviews and opinion articles provide representations of the voices of the actors. In the news, reported speech is used, interviews provide original quotations from the conversation with a subject, while in opinion articles a personality represents him or herself and his or her social and political position through his or her own text.

Next, I explore in detail the specific patterns of collective and personal representations of the Crimean Tatars in the media discourse and provide examples from the media texts that offer typical illustrations of the patterns revealed.

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23 Fairclough, *Media Discourse*, 18.

24 Riggins, “The Rhetoric of Othering,” 13.



## Collective Representations of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian Media Discourse

### *Wording*

Norman Fairclough talks about the interconnection between the choice of the vocabulary in the naming of a certain social group or practice and the variety of categories and ideological implications each naming draws into the discourse.<sup>25</sup>

As for the most common wording used by the national and Crimean media outlets to represent Crimean Tatars as a group, I have defined the following:

1. Generic references “*the Crimean Tatars*” used in various thematic contexts prevail in the media. The generalized reference “Crimean Tatars” is often used to signify representatives of a given group involved in an activity: “*Crimean Tatars-voters traditionally support parties of the national-democratic spectrum.*”<sup>26</sup> Van Leeuwen explains generic references as those that treat each member of a particular group as “specimens of those classes,”<sup>27</sup> and therefore, all the group members are implicitly ascribed with a certain set of political or social characteristics, like, in our case, the lack of knowledge about other cultures or affiliation to one political party. Even though generic terms like “the Crimean Tatars” tend to depersonalize representatives of the group, the term itself is quite ideologically neutral and leaves room for ambivalence, as in various contexts it could mean both group as a whole or part of its members. Such multi-contextual nature of this type of reference can explain the prevalence of its use by the media.

2. The wording “*the Crimean Tatar people*”<sup>28</sup> is used in the media more rarely than the generic “the Crimean Tatars.” While the latter can be used in the variety of contexts, the term “Crimean Tatar people” points directly to the group as a whole and limits the utilization of the term to the ethnicity-driven contexts. The term “the Crimean Tatar people” directly points to the ethnic nature of the group, implies the certain set of national characteristics, references to people’s past and present day political activities. This term is also interconnected with the collective memory of the Crimean Tatars, in particular the memory of deportation of 1944, which is perceived as an integral part of the Crimean Tatar national self-consciousness. Notably, in the national media, the deportation of the Crimean Tatars is frequently placed as a key point of reference for the Ukrainian ethnic consciousness. The memory of deportation is incorporated into the broader milieu of the Ukrainian national collective memory: “*We still need to realize the calamity of the Crimean Tatar people as our own, its deportation right after the return of the Crimean under the Soviet control. It is the same war, its same Ukrainian account.*”<sup>29</sup>

25 Fairclough, *Media Discourse*, 114.

26 [izbirateli krymskie traditsionno tiagoteiut k partiiam natsional-demokraticeskogo tolka] in *Po mazhoritarke projdut Dzoz, Batalin i Deich. Temirgalieva i Kovitidi prokatili? 1 Krymskaia*, June 1–7, 2012.

27 van Leeuwen T., “Representation of Social Actors,” 46.

28 [krymskotatarskyi narod]

29 [Nam shche nalezhyt usvidomyty jak svoiu i bidu krymskotatarskoho narodu, ioho deportatsiiu vidrazu pislia povernennia Krymu pid radianskyi kontrol. Tse ta sama viina, toi samyi ii ukrainskyi

Moreover, many instances of the use of this term are clearly marked as political. Foremost, this term appears in the official names of the Crimean Tatar national bodies of authority “the Milli Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people” and “the Council of representatives of the Crimean Tatar People by the President of Ukraine.” In other cases, the term is strongly tied with the current political discussion of the national rights of the Crimean Tatars or analysis of the outcomes of electoral campaigns, etc.

The Crimean media discourse makes use of this term in a slightly different context. The ethnic memory of the Crimean Tatar people is primarily unified with the collective memories of the other Crimean ethnic minorities that suffered through similar repressions during the Stalin’s era: the Greeks, the Armenians, the Bulgarians and others. Representatives of the Crimean majority — the ethnic Russians — are omitted from this list as a group, which does not share similar tragic collective memories: “*In the Crimean history different events happened, tragic — among them. There were — deportation of the Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Germans and representatives of other peoples.*”<sup>30</sup> Moreover, certain media overtly point to the contradiction between the versions of memory of ethnic minorities and the post-Soviet Russian majority living in the Crimea: “*Too bad that of them our Victory — is their deportation.*”<sup>31</sup> This is a notable example of the discursive construction of exclusion of the ethnic minority group based on the differences in the collective memory shared by the Slavic majority of Crimea and the Crimean Tatars minority that experienced repressions in the past.

3. Term “*repatriates*” is also widely used to refer to the Crimean Tatars as a group. The word itself implies connotations with the process of repatriation from the exile in Central Asia, where the majority of the Crimean Tatars have been living since the 1944. However, this term allows journalists to avoid the use of direct ethnic markers and has no overt historical or commemorative implications. In turn, the meaning behind this term mostly points to the present-day social and political context, primarily to the demands of the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups to the local and national governments — and particularly in the issues of distribution of land plots: “*the Crimean government started the inventory of the land plots, taken over by the repatriates.*”<sup>32</sup>

Another way to represent the process of return of the Crimean Tatars from exile in Central Asia is to use an aggregation — impersonal nouns referring to the group’s numbers — without any further details of other group characteristics: “*in the “Tatar” regions of the peninsular — apart from Bakhchisarayskiy, it is also Kirovskii, — the quantity of repatriates has already overstepped*

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rakhunok] in *Z vysoty nezalezhnosti natsiia pobachyt viinu, Ukraina Moloda*, June 21, 2011.

30 [V istorii Kryma proiskhodili raznye sobytiia, v tom chisle — tragicheskie. Sredi nikh — deportatsiia krymskikh tatar, armian, bolgar, grekov, nemtsev i predstavitelei drugikh narodov] in *Vecher-rekviem, Krymskie Izvestiia*, May 18, 2010.

31 [Ochen zhal, chto dlia nikh nasha Pobeda — eto ikh deportatsiia] in *Dva dnia v mae, Krymskii Telegraf*, May 18, 2012.

32 [“Krymskoe pravitelstvo zanialos inventarizatsiei zemel, zaniatykh repatriantami”] in “*Belo-golubye*” *reshili sozdat tatarskuiu partiiu, Kommentarii*, July 23, 2010.

*the quarter of the population.*<sup>33</sup> Aggregation is commonly used to represent the group in a depersonalized way, where members of a given group are treated “as statistics,” Van Leeuwen argues. According to van Leeuwen, aggregation is a form of nominalization commonly used for discursive discrimination of various minority groups. By nominalization, I mean the use of the noun instead of a verb — shifting the focus from the process of action to its outcome.<sup>34</sup> As Fairclough explains, when the process is “nominalized,” some or all of its participants are omitted.<sup>35</sup>

4. Terms like “*earlier deported citizens*,” “*deportees*,” “*members of the deported people*” and other synonyms are also used to represent specific features of the Crimean Tatars’ group identity. These terms are used in the multiple discursive practices such as the following:

- 1) political debates about securing of the Crimean Tatar people’s political and socio-economic rights, references to Crimean Tatars as to “the source of problems” for the national and local authorities that need to be solved: “*to solve the problems of the deported the state spared only 25 mln. UAH*”<sup>36</sup>;
- 2) references to the historical events of Stalin’s mass deportations of 1944, which often means mentioning other small ethnic groups that have also been repressed;
- 3) ceremonies commemorating the deportation of the Crimean Tatars that are held on May 18 each year.

Another example is the use of particular naming of the Crimean Tatars by the power holders in the public discourse. In 2012, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov challenged the legitimacy of the use of the term “deportees” in public rhetoric of the Crimean Tatar political elites. Reported speech is used by the Crimean newspaper “Krymskie Izvestiia” to report his statement: “*When a deputy of the Supreme Council of ARC Lentun Bezaziev asked about the funds for the resettlement of deportees, the head of the government suggested to stop calling themselves that, because the Crimean Tatars have already joined the Ukrainian people and became its integral part.*”<sup>37</sup> This evasive public statement may speak about the desire of the Ukrainian authorities to omit the discussion of the legal status and the respective rights to be granted to the formerly deported people. The media outlet that reported the Prime Minister’s speech implied solidarity with the statement and did not challenge or problematize it.

5. Terms “indigenous people” or “native population” are used in a number of quite specific instances. These terms are being promoted in the public discourse by the Crimean Tatar political

33 [“...iz “tatarskikh” regionov poluostrova — krome Bakhchisaraiskogo, eto Kirovskii, v kotorykh kolichestvo repatriantov uzhe pereshagnulo za chetvert naseleniia ”] in *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, July 17, 2010.

34 Barbara Johnstone, *Discourse Analysis* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2008), 23.

35 Fairclough, *Media Discourse*, 112.

36 [“...na reshenie problem deportirovannykh gosudarstvo vydেলilo vsego 25 mln. grn.”] in *Korrespondent*, July 13, 2012.

37 [Kogda deputat Verkhovnogo Soveta ARK Lentul Bezaziev podnial vopros o sredstvakh na obustroistvo deportirovannykh, glava pravitelstva predlozhlil perestat nazyvat sebia takovymi, poskolku krymskie tatory uzhe vliis v narod Ukrainy, stali neotemlemoi ego chastiu] in *Krymskie Izvestiia*, October 23, 2012.

elite at both the national and Crimean levels. Crimean Tatar politicians often stress the fact that their population is indigenous to the Crimea. That is why the term “indigenous people” is most frequently present in the mediatized public statements of Mustafa Dzhemiliev and other Crimean Tatar political leaders.

Within the framework of the deportation discourse, the Crimean Tatars are often grouped with other indigenous peoples of the Crimea. This type of discourse normally does not challenge the indigenous status of the Crimean Tatars. However, the discussion of the rights and privileges that should be granted to the previously deported indigenous populations is largely omitted. In rare cases, the term “the indigenous people” is used as a substitute of the name “the Crimean Tatars”. “*The Official Kyiv is in no hurry to actually solve the problems of the native population of the peninsula.*”<sup>38</sup> This use of the term means that the indigenous status of the Crimean Tatar people is not questioned; it is perceived as a common sense.

Generalizing all of the above-mentioned examples of naming of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian media, none of the terms regularly used by the media can be considered offensive or derogatory; on the contrary, most of the terms are rather neutral and utilized in the variety of contexts. However, my findings demonstrated that the specific terms often refer to the specific socio-political contexts in which the minority group, its features and activities are being discussed by the media. The analysis has revealed the fact that the voice of minority group representatives in the media discourse is systematically suppressed their personalization is limited to generic and aggregated terms, and the specific ideological frames of the group’s representations are imposed by the majority.

The analysis also revealed that ideologically neutral and general wording like “the Crimean Tatars” is most commonly used by the national and Crimean media. Even though namings like “deportees” and “repatriates” referring directly to deportation, as a form of repression against this group are present in the media, their utilization is kept marginal and unsystemic. This can be explained by the dominant status of the pro-Russian (or Slavic) ideological stance which shapes the media discourse. As a result of such dominance, the public discussion of the legal status of the Crimean Tatars as formerly repressed or indigenous group is either omitted or backgrounded.

It is also important to bring about Fairclough’s very relevant argument that he makes about the naming of the social minority groups in the media. He claims that despite all the variety of word choices in naming — in our case “the Crimean Tatars,” “repatriates,” “formerly deported people,” “members of deported population,” etc. — all these terms refer to the current position or condition of the group, created in the past. Alternatively, they refer to the people’s belonging to a certain ethnic group. In any case, they do not imply granting any privileges or specific rights to the group’s representatives. To the contrary, in many contexts we have seen that naming tends to signify a potential problem or a threat to the majority group.

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38 [Ofitsialnyi Kiev ne speshit reshhat problemy korennoi natsii poluostrova] in Mustafa Dzhemiliev, No 95. *Natsionalnyi reiting top 100 politikov Ukrainy, Korrespondent*, August 20, 2010.

## Voice

Turning to the collective representation of the Crimean Tatars, there are situations when the Crimean Tatars are directly mentioned in the media texts, though not as active parties in the process, but instead as patients. The “subject-patient” relations in the discourse reflect the existing power relations in the social reality. These relations are manifested in the Ukrainian media discourse in the following typical discursive forms.

The collective references to the Crimean Tatars often contain verbs that express weak position of the group against the other empowered player. The use of the words like “ask” and “plead” implies their social passivity and incapability of achieving something on their own without an external support. This discursive practice can be illustrated by the following utterances, typically used by the journalists when referring to the Crimean Tatars: *“Tatars ask Ianukovych to refrain from formation of the council.”*<sup>39</sup>

In addition, the Crimean Tatars are systematically represented as passive recipient of support from the “stronger and more experienced” party. For instance, in the article about Ukrainian dissident Petro Hryhorenko, he is represented as a strong, powerful figure, while the Crimean Tatars are pictured as a powerless, voiceless group, aggregated as a recipient of his help: *“Hryhorenko was fighting with anti-Semitism, fighting for various people [...] but this was obvious what has been done to Crimean Tatars. Then he started to fight for them, for the most marginalized [...]”*<sup>40</sup>

Representation of the Crimean Tatars as passive “recipients of the state support” is reflected in the title of the article in the Crimean newspaper “Krymskii Telegraf”: *“Simferopol authorities have calculated, how much the Tatars will cost.”*<sup>41</sup> Not only does this utterance imply the passive role of the group, it also explicitly characterizes it as burden to the state and, therefore, to implicitly present “us.”

The weak agency is also achieved in discourse by the use of passive voice in utterances like the following: *“After the Second World War the people went through deportation... and only during perestroika times, after 1989, they were allowed to return.”*<sup>42</sup>

On the other hand, there are instances when the collective representations of the Crimean Tatars are realized by means of active verbal forms. This usually happens in the news about confrontations, street actions and fights that involve representatives of the Crimean Tatar people. In these contexts, the Crimean Tatars are predominantly represented as an active subject of the action, with a strong agency. However, the context in which these actions are represented

39 [Tatary prosiat Ianukovycha vidmovytys vid formuvannia rady] in *Ukraiïnska Pravda*, August 29, 2010, accessed July 1, 2014, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/08/29/5340684/>.

40 [Hryhorenko borovsia z antysemityzmom, borovsia za rizni narody, ... Ale tse prosto vpadalo v ochi — te shcho robyly z kryms'kymy tataramy. Tomu vin stav borotys za nykh iak za naibilsh uposlidzhenykh] in *Ukraiïna Moloda*, February 29, 2012.

41 [Vlasti Simferopolia uzhe podschitali v kakuiu summu oboidutsia tatary] in *Krymskii Telegraf*, 11 March, 2011.

42 [Posle Vtoroi mirovoi narod podvergsia deportatsii [...] i lish vo vremena perestroiki, posle 1989 goda, im razreshili vernutsia] in *Segodnia*, January 10, 2011.



speaks about their active position as a group, which carries potential threat to “normal” people, causes social disturbances and even leads to violence and social unrest: *“The Tatars were fiercely resisting, but had been defeated by the riot police using armored vehicles.”*<sup>43</sup>

Even in cases when the reasons for the (potentially) violent actions are explained and properly backgrounded, the key subject of the news and therefore the party of the conflict that bears all responsibility is the Crimean Tatars. Taking the example of the news coverage of an incident that happened in August 2012 when a group of Crimean Tatars threw eggs in Petro Symonenko, the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine, during his public appearance in Simferopol. In this piece of news the insulters have been portrayed by means of active verbs and strong nouns as “hooligans who throw eggs.” At the same time the agency of their counterparts — people or organizations — which became a target in the action remained suppressed, and, in this manner, their responsibility for any disrespectful and offensive behavior which may have led to this confrontation is mitigated: *“The group of Crimean Tatar has scattered the chief communist with eggs and rotten fruits. In this way the Tatars demanded from Symonenko to apologize for the justification of the forced resettlement in 1944 under the Stalin’s command.”*<sup>44</sup> As opposed to what was previously mentioned about the construction of the socially passive image of the Crimean Tatars, in the news about political struggle, which involve Crimean Tatars, the active forms of verbs are used. However, the dominant frame here is to represent the Crimean Tatars as “protesters,” rather than “experts,” “moderators” or “peacemakers.” Crimean Tatars normally “demand,” “call for,” “express protest” and “resent” and quite rarely “propose,” “compromise,” “submit” or “analyze.” The active words like “demand” and “protest” are often associated either with aggression or the provocative nature of the political activities described, for instance, as follows: *“At the beginning of March a rally in Massandra took place, where the deported citizen of the Crimean Tatars expressed the extreme outrage with the actions of the deputies of the village headed by Liubov Arzamasova.”*<sup>45</sup>

Alongside with these representations of the Crimean Tatars, the Ukrainian national and Crimean authorities are continuously represented as “active,” “constructive” and “ready for the dialogue”. The media reported as strong and constructive the position of the Ukrainian Prime-Minister in dealing with the Crimean Tatars’ issues in the following: *“I will go there (to the Crimea. — A.B.) and will deal with everything on the ground, because we are now fixing the situation with the Crimean Tatars and with their leaders, — said Mykola Azarov.”*<sup>46</sup> Similarly, in

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43 [Tatary otchaianno soprotivlialis, no byli slomleny militseiskim spetsnazom s ispolzovaniem bronetekhniki] in *Segodnia*, March 12, 2010.

44 [hrupa krymskykh tatar zakydala holovnoho komunista kraiinyy iaitsiamy i hnylymy fruktamy. U takyi sposib tatary vymahaly vid Symonenka vybachen za vypravdannia nasylnytskoho pereselennia u 1944 za nakazom Stalina tatar z Krymu] in *Ukrainska Pravda*, August 22, 2012, accessed July 1, 2014, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2012/08/22/6971308/>.

45 [V nachale marta sostoiatsia miting v Massandre, gde deportirovannyye grazhdane iz chisla krymskotatarskogo naroda vyrazhali krainee vozmushchenie deistviiami deputatskogo korpusa poselka vo glave s golovoi Liubov’iu Arzamasovoi] in *Krymskii Telegraf*, March 7, 2010.

46 [“Ya tudy (v Krym. — A. B.) zlitaiu i na mistsi rozberusia, tomu shcho my zaraz tam popravliaiemo sytuatsiiu i vidnovliuiemo dialoh z kryms’kymy tataramy, v tomu chysli z iikh kerivnytstvom,” —



this utterance the agency of the Crimean Tatars and their political leaders is expressed passively. In van Dijk's terms, the discursive strategy that juxtaposes the "resentful" them and the "helpful" us is called "positive self-presentation vs. negative other-presentation"<sup>47</sup> and is considered one of the most commonly used strategies for the exclusion of minority groups.

Summing up, the collective representations of the Crimean Tatars can be divided into two large groups. These groups are instances when their agency is suppressed in the relations with more powerful social players, normally representatives of the "majority" groups or state power holders. The political power and capacity for social influence of the latter is often contrasted with the "social passivity" of the Crimean Tatars, reflected in the discourse by the passive forms of verbs and the use of "passivating" nouns.

The second groups are instances when the Crimean Tatars are active agents. This happens, however, mostly in news about protests, street actions and political confrontations, where the Crimean Tatars are usually portrayed as the primary source of social unrest or conflict. In these circumstances, their activities underline their seeming aggression and deviance.

### **Personal Representations of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian Media Discourse**

Besides the collective representations of the Crimean Tatars, the media discourse also contains personal accounts of the individual Crimean Tatars. Personal representation of social actors envisages the presence in the discourse of individuals (rather than groups), with their specific features (like name, age, social status etc). As van Leeuwen argues, individual social actors can be represented in a variety of ways, such as uniquely or as sharing attributes with others in a group or groups.<sup>48</sup>

As Teun A. van Dijk points out, the symbolic elites — such as politicians, scholars, people of culture and arts — play a special role in the reproduction of the dominant knowledge and ideology in society.<sup>49</sup> The ethnic minority elites, however, are ascribed with a lower status of expertise in the general hierarchy of knowledge and, consequently, are often marginalized as public speakers and commentators for the media.

As for the media representation of individual Crimean Tatars, the list of their specific personalities as well as their unique features reported in the national media is quite short. According to my findings, political leader of the Milli Mejlis, MP Mustafa Dzhemiliev is the most often mentioned representative of the Crimean Tatar people. In the sample of the national mainstream media texts from 2010 through 2012, his name was mentioned 293 times, while the name of the MP Refat Chubarov, the deputy head of the Milli Mejlis was mentioned 75 times. Another well-known Crimean politician, the Crimean Tatar Il'mi Umerov was mentioned

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skazav Mykola Azarov] in *Ukrainska Pravda*, June 23, 2010, accessed July 1, 2014, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/06/23/5166121/>.

47 T. A. van Dijk, "Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism," in *Hate Speech*, eds. R. Whillock and D. Slayden (London: Sage, 1995), 8.

48 Van Leeuwen, "Representation of Social Actors," 52.

49 T. A. van Dijk, "Contextual Knowledge Management in Discourse Production," 85.

39 times, while Jamala — the popular jazz-singer of the Crimean Tatar origin — was mentioned only 27 times.

At the all-Ukrainian level, the most frequently quoted Crimean Tatar whose comments on the current political events are referred to as from an expert is Mustafa Dzhemiliev, who is conventionally nominated by the media according to his national organization and parliamentary affiliations, as in these examples: “*Head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, member of NUNS*<sup>50</sup> *Mustafa Dzhemiliev.*”<sup>51</sup>

The Crimean media uses more personal references to Crimean Tatar politicians, civic activists, artists, religious leaders and “ordinary” people. The number of the Crimean Tatar politicians whose voices are regularly reported by the media is more numerous and diverse, presenting a larger variety of names and organizations. This could be explained by the fact that, for the Crimean media, the information about Crimean Tatar personalities is considered local and, therefore, more newsworthy. The names of the Crimean Tatars politicians, such as political leaders of the Milli Mejlis and other Crimean Tatar ethnic political organizations, Crimean Tatars who have been appointed heads of the Crimean district state administrations, members of local councils of self-government, are among the most frequently mentioned names in the Crimean media.

However, the Crimean mainstream media use different discursive strategies to represent members of the Crimean Tatar political elite depending on the outlets’ ideological affiliations and their attitudes to the Crimean Tatars as an ethnic group in general. For example, the “*Krymskii Telegraf*” weekly takes an extremely anti-Tatar and anti-Mejlis stand and, therefore, in personal references to the Crimean Tatar political leaders, regularly uses nominations that aim to stress the illegal status of Mustafa Dzhemiliev as head of the Milli Mejlis and to challenge his claims for power and control over the whole ethnic group of the Crimean Tatars: “*Mustafa Dzhemiliev, [...] self-proclaimed leader of the Crimean Tatars.*”<sup>52</sup>

In contrast, “*1 Krymskaia*” weekly, which is quite loyal to the Crimean Tatars, underlines the extraordinary influence and authority of Mustafa Dzhemiliev among the Crimean Tatar political elite by adding the suffix “-aga,” the Crimean Tatar national form of addressing to a respected man: “*Mustafa-aga, giving up his post and moving aside, will be patronizing his successor, will be so to speak, keeping the reigns, directing from the top of his authority, correcting the political course of Mejlis.*”<sup>53</sup>

In the national media, the Crimean Tatar experts are only given voice to comment on the issues related to their own people. The expert representatives of the ethnic minority very rarely comment on topics of general interest that are not directly related to the affairs of their minority

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50 NUNS — abbreviation for *Nasha Ukraina-Narodna Samooborona* (Our Ukraine-People’s Self-defence) political bloc.

51 [holova Mejlisu krymskotatarskoho narodu, “NUNSivets” Mustafa Dzhemiliev] in *Ukraina Moloda*, May 29, 2012.

52 [Mustafa Dzhemiliev, [...] samonazvannyi lider krymskikh tatar] in *Krymskii Telegraf*, August 3, 2012.

53 [Mustafa-aga, ustupiv svoi post i nemnogo otoidia v storonu, budet opekat preemnika, i tak skazat vesti pod uzdtsy, napravliat s vysoty svoego avtoriteta, korrektilovat politicheskii kurs mejlisa] in *Krymskaia*, 27 April — 3 May, 2012.

group. But at the Crimean level, the boundaries are not so obviously drawn by the media, and the Crimean Tatar speakers often comment on a variety of issues, including ones of general interest. For instance, in the text about the Crimean student life, a comment of a Crimean Tatar student activist, referred to as the “*Head of the Student Council of the Faculty of the Crimean Tatar and Turkish philology of the Crimean Engineer-pedagogical University Eskender Ganiiev*,”<sup>54</sup> is provided together with the voices of other students, who are referred to by their Slavic names.

According to van Leeuwen, together with nominated forms of personal representation, there are also categorized representations of the social actors that characterize individuals according to a certain social function or activity or according to their relational status. For instance, the Crimean Tatars who are referred to by their name are also represented according to their immediate function or activity. This brings in certain contextualization of the information given in the news and the role that these individuals play in the reported events. There are also special types of personal references — nicknames — that are also used by the media to point out certain features of a person, but in a more outstanding, often scandalous way. For instance, in the Crimean press, Crimean Tatar activist Daniyal Ametov is nicknamed as “the king of self-seizures.” “*Krymskii Telegraf*” uses this reference to stress Ametov’s allegedly illegal activities with regard to the process of land distribution in Crimea: “*the Crimean “king of self-seizures” Daniyal Ametov is accused of the organized resistance to the police’s operation on demolition of the illegal buildings of the Crimean Tatars...*”<sup>55</sup> At the same time another Crimean newspaper, “*1 Krymskaia*,” demonstrates a more neutral position towards Ametov and his activities, which is reflected in distancing from the direct use of the nickname: “*Ametov, labeled in the Crimean press as “king of self-seizures.*”<sup>56</sup>

In this section of the study, I showed the work of the popular attitudes and ideological affiliations of a specific media outlet in representing the individual representatives of the Crimean Tatars. My findings demonstrated the general pattern that the media that keep a neutral or loyal position towards the Crimean Tatars tend to use more specific nominalizations of a personality, use more of the Crimean Tatar individuals and give room for the voices of minority group experts to comment to the broad spectrum of social issues. Media outlets that share a more critical or overtly anti-Tatar stance use a variety of discursive tools, which may vary from derogatory nicknames to suppression of personal expertise of the minority group representatives, challenging capacity of the minority representatives to create socially valuable knowledge, which could be reported in the media. The overall representation strategy utilized by these media outlets aims to downplay very claims of the minority group leaders to establish themselves as legitimate power holders within the Crimean society.

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54 [predsedatel studsoвета fakulteta krymskotatarskoi i turetskoi filologii Krymskogo inzhenerno-pedagogicheskogo universiteta (KIPU) Eskender Ganiiev] in *1 Krymskaia*, 27 January — 2 February, 2012.

55 [Krymskogo “korolia samozakhvatov” Daniiala Ametova obviniaut v organizatsii protivodeystviia spetsoperatsii militsii i sluzhby gosudarstvennogo ispolneniia po snosu nezakonnykh postroek krymskikh tatar] in *Krymskii Telegraf*, 27 May — 4 June, 2010.

56 [Ametov, prozvannyi v krymskoi presse “korolem zamozakhvatov”] in *1 Krymskaia*, February 17–23, 2012.

## Voice

As mentioned above, the voices of the individual representatives of the minority groups can vary depending on the ideological stance of the media outlet and the media formats and genres used by the media to report the news.

In order to discuss the differences in giving the voice to specific Crimean Tatar individuals, I compared the representation of the same news story in the two national daily newspapers that also share similar pattern of news formats: “Ukraiina Moloda” and “Segodnia.”

For instance, the article “The right to headscarf”, published in “Ukraiina Moloda,” is dedicated to the court case of the Crimean Tatar Muslim Susanna Ismailova, who demanded the right to be photographed for a passport wearing headscarf. In the leading part of the news the author uses reported speech to write about the arguments that “Muslim women” — the collective aggregation is used here — are putting forward in support of their demand: “*Muslim women stressed that those, who assign the followers of Islam with “the right to be headscarf free”, do not ask the women themselves.*”<sup>57</sup> Speculating about the pros and cons of wearing khidzhab in the European countries, the voice of the women themselves remains suppressed. The voice of the key subject of the court appeal, Susanna Ismailova, is absent in the text. Only a quotation of the leader of Muslim Women’s League is provided at the last paragraph of the news piece.

The other media outlet, “Segodnia,” reports the same news using a quotation of Ismailova in the second paragraph of the news text. In the direct speech, the woman voices her argument: “*I am wearing headscarf for 10 years, as it is assigned by the Koran, — tells Susanna to “Segodnia.” [...] This is our lifestyle and living in the democratic country we should have a right to that.*”<sup>58</sup> Apart from Ismailova’s quotation, three other voices are represented with quotes: the voice of Ismailova’s attorney and the voices of two Muslim women who express their positions on the matter.

As we can see in the first article published in “Ukraiina Moloda,” the individual voice of the woman who is struggling for her right is absent and the points of view of other individual Muslim women are suppressed. The second article in “Segodnia” demonstrates the alternative hierarchy of voices. It provides space for discussion of the issue to the Muslim women themselves and to Ismailova, treating them as active subjects of this discourse. In none of the materials are the voices of the representatives of the official state institutions or experts provided.

In this case, the differences in patterns of representation of individual voices while covering news stories by different media outlets also speak about broader ideological implications of covering gender-sensitive stories in the national media discourse on the power relations between men and women in society in general.

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57 [Zhinky-musulmanky naholoshuvaly, shcho ti, khto obstoiuie dlia spovidnyts islamu “pravo na vilne vid khustky zhyttia,” ne pytayut dumky pro tse samykh zhinok] in *Ukraiina Moloda*, July 21, 2010.

58 [Ia uzhe desyat let noshu khidzhab, kak predpisano nam Koranom, — rasskazala “Segodnia” Susanna. Eto nash obraz zhizni, i my v demokraticheskoi strane dolzhny imet na neto pravo] in *Segodnia*, January 25, 2010.

## Impersonal Representations of the Crimean Tatars: The Discourse of the Unsatisfied

The impersonal references do not specify any social characteristics of the people included in the referred groups, they are based on the complete depersonification of the individual group members. The aggregated group identification is made according to one dominating function; the association of this function with the group is purely ideological and can be a powerful tool of social exclusion. Van Leeuwen argues that “the systematic use of impersonal references and impersonal adjectives (like “black, poor, unskilled, Muslim”), which omits the use of the unique identifications, are used to discriminate the actors and stress on the social boundaries between the groups.”<sup>59</sup>

In the Crimean mainstream media the discourse on the “Crimean Tatar problem” is represented in its own specific variation, which may be called “the discourse of the unsatisfied.” As a part of the discursive strategy of the “positive self-representation and negative other-representation” discussed earlier, the Crimean media portray the Crimean Tatars as “unsatisfied.” The Crimean Tatars, together with their political leaders who represent the group in the regional bodies of authority, are represented as the ones, which can not stop criticizing the majority-backed decision-makers and keep demanding privileges for themselves. Various Crimean media outlets continuously demonstrate this strategy in more subtle or more overt forms.

“Krymskii Telegraf” labels the Crimean Tatars as “resentful” and abusive of “all the best in the Crimea”: *“All the best in our Crimea — is exclusively to the Crimean Tatars. Taking into account that there are more than 100 ethnic groups in the republic, the special treatment of only one group of repatriates, who always call themselves offended, cannot stay unnoticed.”*<sup>60</sup> It is notable that “us” in the utterance “in our Crimea” means the indirectly presented main actor, the ethnic majority, which is believed to provide all the goods, while the Crimean Tatars — are portrayed the ungrateful recipients of privileges provided in prejudice of other groups of deportees. It also implies that it is abnormal for the minority group to demand rights publicly, reinforcing the popular belief that the minority groups have to stay quiet and be grateful for what has been provided to them by the majority.

In tune with the unspoken presupposition mentioned above, “Krymskii Telegraf” called Refat Chubarov, the Crimean Tatar member of the Crimean parliament, “The unsatisfaction of the year”<sup>61</sup> for being too critical about the inefficient work of the Crimean authorities in implementing the programs of state support for deportees. The focus placed by the newspaper on the MP’s “unsatisfaction” shifts the discussion away from discussion of the faults in the work of the autonomy’s state officials, leaving them unproblematic: *“Member of the Crimean Parliament Refat Chubarov appeared to be the most “unsatisfied” activist of this year. At first he was*

59 van Leeuwen, “Representation of Social Actors,” 60.

60 [...samoe luchshe u nas v Krymu — iskluchitelno krymskim tataram. Esli uchest, chto v respublike prozhivaiut predstaviteli sta natsionalnostei i etnicheskikh grup, to osoboe vnimanie lish k odnoi natsionalnosti repatriantov, vechno nazyvaiushchikh sebia obizhennymi, ne mozhet ne ostatsia nezamechennym] in *Krymskii Telegraf*, June 15, 2012.

61 [Nedovolstvo goda].



*short of money for deportees. Then suddenly it came out that the budget funds have not been used at all[...]*<sup>62</sup>

“Krymskie Izvestiia” follows the same pattern, systematically mentioning Chubarov’s critical comments as opposed to “the constructive work” of the pro-government members of the Crimean parliament. In order to pinpoint the critical manner of Chubarov’s speeches, the newspaper refers to common sense, by using words like “obviously,” to naturalize the Crimean Tatar MP’s image of a “never ending criticizer”: “*in the group of the unhappy about the language, obviously, was Refat Chubarov.*”<sup>63</sup>

By the systematic use of the “us-good” versus “them-bad” strategy in representing the Crimean Tatar politicians as opposed to the non-Tatar state officials, the Crimean media construct a commonsensical image of the Crimean Tatars as “unsatisfied” and “scandalous” minority group. As I also demonstrated, similar discursive strategy is used to frame an image of the individual group representative, in this way adding to a generic bias about the minority group as a whole.

## Conclusions

In this study of the Ukrainian and Crimean media discourses on the Crimean Tatars during 2010–2012, my major argument is that the implicit forms of discrimination of the Crimean Tatars in the media discourse prevail over the overt forms of hate speech and other obvious discursive manifestations of intergroup domination. Van Dijk speaks about ideological and structural nature of such domination, which includes “political, economic and socio-cultural structures of inequality, processes and practices of exclusion and marginalization, as well as socio-cognitive representations required for such structures.”<sup>64</sup> According to my findings, the key pattern of the discursive representation of the Crimean Tatars as a minority group stresses the group’s weaker social and political positioning, presents it as a less powerful and dependent social actor compared to the more powerful Slavic majority of the Crimea. Having said that, one of the dominant media frames portrays the group, as well as its individual members, as a potential threat and burden for the majority group, sharing the commonsensical presupposition that the ethnic minority groups have no right to challenge the domination of the majority by demanding rights and privileges and should silently accept their subordinate position. As Fairclough states in this regard, the more effective this ideological implication becomes in legitimizing existing power inequalities, the less overt are the forms the ideology takes to manifest itself in the discourse.<sup>65</sup>

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62 [Deputat Verkhovnogo Soveta Kryma Refat Chubarov okazalsia samym “neudovletvorennym” deiatelem etogo goda. Snachala emu bylo malo deneg na nuzhdy deportirovannykh. Prichem potom vdrug okazalos, chto opredelennie budzhetnie summy tak i ostalis neosvoennymi] in *Krymskii Telegraf*, December 30, 2011.

63 [V riadakh nedovolnykh iazykom okazalsia, estestvenno, Refat Chubarov] in *Krymskii Telegraf*, August 17, 2012.

64 T. A. van Dijk, *Racism and the Press* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 27.

65 Fairclough, *Language and Power*.



As I have demonstrated in my research, the ideological forms of inequality have been manifesting in the media discourse of the Crimean Tatars mainly through the more or less subtle, indirect and therefore less open and less obvious forms of discrimination. These are variously called “new” or “symbolic” racism, as opposed to the “old” racism, which envisages overt blatant rhetoric mechanisms.<sup>66</sup> Van Dijk argues that the shift from the “old” to the “new” racism could also be called a switch from racism to ethnicism — an ideology that “recognizes socio-cultural differences between the ethnic groups, but denies differences in power and hence the dominance of the western culture.”<sup>67</sup> In our case, the cultural and political domination of the Russian-speaking Slavic majority of the Crimea is manifested in the public denial of the right to protest and demand rights and freedoms for a people that have suffered through the repressions in the past. This denial is manifested in the scandalous forms of labeling of the individual Crimean Tatar activists and politicians who demand social support and fair procedures in the distribution of social goods (like land plots or budget funds) to minorities.

As Krzyzanowski and Wodak argue, the construction of “us” and “them” is the basic foundation of social exclusion. The discursive construction of the latter includes both overt and mitigated forms of labeling of social actors, generalization of negative stereotypes, exclusion of many and politically correct inclusion of some.<sup>68</sup> As I have shown in this study, the Crimean Tatars are widely labeled in the media as “the unsatisfied” and the deviant. Criminal activities or other negative characteristics of the individual representatives of the Crimean Tatar people are frequently projected on the group as a whole. Furthermore, while the majority of the group’s representatives are systematically reported in the generalized depersonalized forms, certain members of the political and cultural elite (like the Mejlis leader Mustafa Dzhemiliev or singer Jamala) are included into the national political and cultural discourses as equal to the representatives of the ethnic majority elites.

The results of my study exposed the overwhelming prevalence of the group representations over personal ones. Personal accounts, in turn, are quite often categorized according to the specific context of the news and often build the one-sided biased vision of the personality. The impersonal representations attribute the people to a certain group that is often associated with social exclusion and discrimination. In general, the audiences of the national mainstream media are familiarized only with a very limited list of the Crimean Tatars, the majority of whom are representatives of the political and cultural elites. Mustafa Dzhemiliev remains the only well-known Crimean Tatar, who is a key newsmaker at the national level and who the media often quotes and interviews.

The ideological nature of the choice of vocabulary was clearly demonstrated in the naming of the Crimean Tatars as a group. As demonstrated above, the convention of using the generic wording “the Crimean Tatars” dominated the media discourse and news texts in particular during the analyzed period. Terms like “the Crimean Tatar people,” “the repatriates” or “the

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66 See van Dijk T. A., “*Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism*”; Wodak R., de Cillia R., Reisigl M., Liebhart K., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Fairclough, *Language and Power*.

67 van Dijk T. A., *Racism and the Press*, 28.

68 Krzyzanowski and Wodak, *The Politics of Exclusion*, 13.

deportees,” which refer to the specific features of the group and hence imply their special status or rights, are used either not so widely or in a context where their meaning is limited to the synonym of the simple name of the group. The terms “native” or “indigenous” people are mostly promoted by the Crimean Tatar political elite. The omission (and even publicly confronting) of the use of the terms like “indigenous” or “deported” people with regards to the Crimean Tatars by the representatives of the Crimean and national authorities speaks to their unwillingness to adopt necessary legal norms to secure rights and privileges for this minority group.

The personal representation of the Crimean Tatars, being quite limited at the national level, increases and diversifies in the Crimean mainstream media. Besides the leader of the Milli Mejlis Mustafa Dzhemiliev, who remains the Crimean Tatar most recognized in the national media, the Crimean press represents variety of the representatives of the Crimean Tatar political, cultural and business elite. Average people, however, receive little to no media representation.

As for the agency of the Crimean Tatars, the research has revealed the following: in the general news the agency of the collective is mostly suppressed or passivated, they are represented in the less powerful position of the “suppliant” or “recipient,” and in many instances the subject of the action is backgrounded or completely omitted. But in the news about conflicts, street confrontations or scandals, the Crimean Tatars are often positioned an active subject, which “demands” and “criticizes” rather than “seeks compromise or dialogue.” This discursive strategy builds on the negative image of the Crimean Tatars as a potential threat to civic order and a source of various problems.

Ethnic markers of identity make up an important factor of sustaining of the political and cultural domination of the Russian Slavic majority of Crimea, suppressing the Crimean Tatars attempts to develop their own national political agenda, which is closely interconnected with the rediscovery of their national — greatly traumatic — history and their language and culture. The social boundaries between the Slavic majority and the ethnic minorities of Crimea is a highly contingent and sensitive milieu, and it is pertinent to remember that the challenge of the divisiveness of the collective identities based on ethnic markers is a contested space in which the various political conflicts manifest themselves. Due to the Russian annexation of Crimea in spring of 2014, the current political status of the Crimean peninsular, as well as the destiny of the Crimean Tatar people remains unclear. In this regard, Ukrainian political elites should address the need of establishment of the mutually respectful long-term dialogue with the Crimean Tatar elites, displaced from the occupied territories and currently living in the Ukrainian mainland and aim to strengthen relations with the Ukrainian society.

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#### List of media outlets

##### *National media:*

- "Dzerkalo Tyzhnia"
- "Kommentarii"
- "Korrespondent"
- "Segodnia"
- "Ukraina Moloda"

##### *Crimean media:*

- "Krymskie Izvestiia"
- "Krymskii Telegraf"
- "1 Krymskaia"

##### *Online media:*

- "Ukrainska Pravda"



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