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# **INTELLIGENCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATE POWER AND ITS USE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

### ***Abstract***

*The article makes an attempt to theoretically substantiate why intelligence is an independent instrument of state power, its common and distinctive features with other instruments of power. The paper also provides historical examples of the use of intelligence by various states to influence the behaviour of other states, as well as various approaches used therein.*

*Some features of the use of the intelligence instrument of power by states in the conditions of the existence of bipolar and multipolar political systems are also highlighted in the article. It also draws attention to the incentives for the choice of intelligence as an alternative to other instruments of power in the context of the limiting impact of global collective security systems, in particular the United Nations.*

### ***Key Words***

*Foreign Policy, Intelligence, Instruments of Power, Balance of Power, Security, Conflict*

### **Introduction**

States use various instruments of power to achieve their national interests in the international arena. The existence of four instruments of state power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) – in the overwhelming majority does not cause controversy among aca-

demics and practitioners. There is no such consensus on intelligence. We believe that intelligence is an independent instrument of power and intend to prove it.

Before embarking on some thoughts on the role of intelligence in international politics, let us define the very concept of 'intelligence' for the purposes of this article. By intelligence in this article, depending on the context, we mean the foreign intelligence agencies of a state, as well as intelligence activities conducted against other states and non-state actors outside the country. Also, in some cases, intelligence will mean information collected, processed, analysed and disseminated by such intelligence agencies.

Foreign intelligence activities, in turn, are divided by us into two types:

- the first type – activities for the collection of intelligence from foreign sources, its processing, analysis and communication a certain circle of consumers, primarily for those who determine the policy of the state (policymakers);
- the second type – activities to influence the behaviour of other states, external non-state actors, the situation or course of events in the international arena or in an international organization.

Both types of intelligence activities can be carried out through covert and clandestine intelligence operations. However, if the goal of the first type of activity is permissible, non-political and limited influence on the behaviour of one's own state, then the goal of the second is to influence the opposite direction – on the behaviour of another state or non-state actor.

Adrian Wolfberg and Brian A. Young argue that intelligence is not an instrument of power. They, unlike us, define intelligence only as the creation and analysis of information leading to knowledge creation. In their opinion, the main purpose of intelligence is similar to the purpose of a shield (protection of the source of power), and diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments, in turn, are associated with a spear (projection of power). They also consider DIME instruments and intelligence to be referred to as instruments and enablers.<sup>1</sup>

In government documents in the field of national security of one of the most powerful states in the world – the United States of America – a set of four instruments of state power is mentioned, namely: diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME). For example, it is DIME that is mentioned in one of the Congressional Research Service documents prepared

<sup>1</sup> Wolfberg A and Young BA (2016) Is Intelligence An Instrument Of National Power? *American Intelligence Journal* 33 (1): 26-30. Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311962928\\_Is\\_Intelligence\\_an\\_Instrument\\_of\\_National\\_Power](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311962928_Is_Intelligence_an_Instrument_of_National_Power).

in 2020 for the purpose of public understanding of the information provided to members of Congress.<sup>2</sup> The 2019 NATO AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operations Planning also mentions the four-element DIME set of instruments.<sup>3</sup>

In neither case, the set does not include an intelligence instrument of state power.

At the same time, US government documents contain a different understanding of the set of instruments of state power. The National Defense Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, submitted by the US Department of Defense in 2006, mentions a set of the following instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL).<sup>4</sup> Here, the intelligence instrument is already mentioned separately from the others, which in our opinion is justified.

The study of intelligence activity always presents a certain difficulty, which is associated with the lack of reliable and complete information about it due to its specificity. This affects the quantity, topics and methods of research in this area. Therefore, declassified archived documents are a valuable source of information about intelligence activities.

In order to confirm that an intelligence instrument is an independent instrument of state power, we will resort to several methods.

Firstly, we will apply the historical method and study the approaches, methods and purposes of states' use of intelligence as an instrument of power. We will do this on the basis of one of the few ancient works that have survived to date about the ability to govern a state – the ancient Indian treatise Arthashastra, as well as archived documents of the twentieth century about the activities of foreign intelligence agencies in the USA and the USSR.

Secondly, we will apply the method of deduction in order to give our own definition of the power of a state in international politics on the basis of the general principles and propositions that we share about what power is in general. Then, we point out the similarities and differences between the intelligence instrument and other instruments of state power.

<sup>2</sup> Theohary CA (2020): Defense Primer: Information operations. CRS Report R45142. 15 December. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10771>.

<sup>3</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2019): NATO Standard AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning Of Operation. Brussels: NATO Standardization Office. Last modified May 24, 2019. Available at: [https://www.coemed.org/files/stanags/01\\_AJP/AJP-5\\_EDA\\_V2\\_E\\_2526.pdf](https://www.coemed.org/files/stanags/01_AJP/AJP-5_EDA_V2_E_2526.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> United States Department of Defense (2006): National military strategic plan for the war on terrorism. 1 February. Washington, DC: Homeland Security Digital Library. Available at: <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=459916>.

Thirdly, we will analyze some of the provisions of US national legislation, which enshrines one of the main distinguishing features of an intelligence instrument of power.

Fourthly, we will analyze the place of intelligence agencies in the system of organs of states that have used or are using intelligence in international politics most widely. The characteristics found common to all will serve as arguments regarding the independence of the intelligence instrument of the state power.

Fifthly, we point out how the international political system affects the use of the intelligence instrument of power by states and its advantages over other instruments of state power.

### **Power of the state in international politics and its instruments**

Robert Dahl once stated that power is a relationship in which one can get the other to do what the latter otherwise would not do.<sup>5</sup>

As we can see, this understanding indicates four aspects. First, the actors are in unequal relationships; the second – one of the actors has a goal that meets his interests in obtaining a certain result desired for himself and at the same time contradicting the interests of another subject, undesirable or at least neutral for the latter. The third aspect – achieving the desired result involves the use of certain methods, as well as appropriate instruments. The fourth aspect assumes that one of the actors, with a desire and using correctly selected instruments and methods, will receive the desired result for themselves, regardless of the degree and number of efforts of the other.<sup>6</sup> As Max Weber rightly noted once: ‘Power means any chance, (no matter whereon this chance is based) to carry through one’s (individual or collective) own will (even against resistance)’.<sup>7</sup>

The main actors of international politics are states, although there are different opinions on this matter. Some argue that non-state actors, in particular international organizations or transnational corporations, are also structural elements of the international political system along with states. As Kenneth Waltz notes, ‘States are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that flou-

<sup>5</sup> Dahl RA (1957): The concept of power. *Behavioral Science* 2(3): 202- 203. DOI: [doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303](https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303).

<sup>6</sup> Two caveats should be made here. First, in the process of reasoning, we deliberately excluded the interference of third actors and external factors in the relationship between the two others. Second, the greater the difference in power between actors, the easier it is for the dominant actor to achieve the desired result, and vice versa.

<sup>7</sup> Wallimann I, Tatsis NC and Zito GV (1977): On Max Weber's Definition Of Power. *The Australian And New Zealand Journal Of Sociology* 13 (3): 234. DOI: [doi:10.1177/144078337701300308](https://doi.org/10.1177/144078337701300308).

rish within them but by the major ones'.<sup>8</sup>

Edward Hallett Carr points out that 'politics are, then, in one sense always power politics ... When states cooperate with one another to maintain postal or transport services, or to prevent the spread of epidemics or suppress the traffic in drugs, these activities are described as "non-political" or "technical". But as soon as an issue arises which involves, or is thought to involve, the power of one state in relation to another, the matter at once becomes "political"'.<sup>9</sup>

Based on previous propositions, we suggest that state power in international politics is the capability to influence the behaviour of other states, non-state actors or the course of events by applying a set of instruments possessed by that state to stand up for its national interest.

Some authors believe that intelligence has an auxiliary function in relation to the instruments of power, it only facilitates their use and is not an instrument of power in itself.<sup>10</sup> This statement could be correct if it was only about one of the types of intelligence activities identified by us earlier, namely, activities to collect intelligence from foreign sources, its processing, analysis and communication to a certain circle of consumers. However, if we are talking about another type of intelligence activity – activities to influence the behaviour of other states and non-state actors, the situation or the course of events in the international arena or in an international organization – then it unequivocally classifies intelligence as an instrument of state power.

Thus, a characteristic attribute of intelligence as an instrument of power is that it, like other instruments, is designed to influence the behaviour of states or non-state actors and can be used separately from others. Although, in practice, states almost always combine various instruments of power to achieve the desired result.

At the same time, precisely what classifies intelligence as an instrument of power – activity of the second type – significantly distinguishes it from other instruments of power. What makes the intelligence instrument of power unique is the method and means of its application. Intelligence is used covertly or clandestinely, which allows it to achieve the desired result secretly without attributing such activities and their results to the state using this instru-

<sup>8</sup> Waltz KN (1979): *Theory Of International Politics*. Berkeley: Addison- Wesley Publishing Company 93.

<sup>9</sup> Carr EH (2001): *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. Cox M (ed). Chippenham: Palgrave Macmillan 97.

<sup>10</sup> Wolfberg A and Young BA (2016) *Is Intelligence An Instrument Of National Power?* *American Intelligence Journal* 33 (1): 26-30. Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311962928\\_Is\\_Intelligence\\_an\\_Instrument\\_of\\_National\\_Power](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311962928_Is_Intelligence_an_Instrument_of_National_Power).

ment. This allows (its user) to completely hide or plausibly deny influence on the behaviour of another state or the course of events, formally not exceeding the limits beyond which the unwanted involvement of other actors in them can follow. By remaining unnoticed when exercising influence, the state reserves the opportunity to radically change the strategies for achieving results in the future. In addition, the intelligence instrument is well suited to erode temporary or even permanent alliances and destroy them.

The principles of total concealment or plausible deniability apply both to government policies regarding the use of an intelligence instrument and to individual intelligence operations or a series of operations.

Based on the methods chosen to influence the desired behaviour of another state or non-state actor, three different approaches can be distinguished, which, however, may well be used in different combinations.

The first is a direct impact on individuals whose political or military-political decisions determine the behaviour of the state. This should also include the removal from power of such persons or even their elimination.<sup>11</sup> The second is to support an opposition group, party or other organization fighting for power, on condition or with the hope that they will provide decisions that will change the behaviour of the state in the right direction. The third is influencing the entire population or particular groups, whose opinion will ultimately influence the position of individuals and bodies whose decisions determine the behaviour of the state.

Reference to the impact on those determining the behaviour of a state or non-state actor, i.e., the first approach, we can find in ancient documents. The ancient Indian political treatise Arthashastra, for example, contains recommendations to the ruler about influencing other rulers in order to destroy alliances:

*Hostile associations should be overcome by sowing discord among them...Spies should be in all [such associations] and notice those parties that lead to mutual disagreements, enmity and quarrelling among [members] of associations. Having noted such points, they should sow discord in a consistently carefully prepared way, saying, for example, "so-and-so slanders you". Such [incitement] should be made against both parties [which are desirable to split]. When enmity is sown among the members of the association, then [spies] ... must create a pretext for ... petty quarrels, which have knowledge, art, play and amusement as the object. It is also possible that the instigators, by inappropriate praise in places such as brothels and pubs, cause*

<sup>11</sup>The moral and legal aspects of this kind of actions are not the subject of this article.

*quarrel among the leaders of the associations’.*<sup>12</sup>

In the same treatise, there is mention of how to organize an operation to eliminate the rulers of another state by fraudulent means, variants of legends for spies that could interest the ruler of another state and help lure him to a certain place to kill, and even possible methods of murder.

In 1997, agents of the Israeli secret intelligence service MOSSAD tried to liquidate by poisoning in Jordan one of the leaders of the Palestinian movement Hamas, which the State of Israel considers a terrorist organization. Although the operation was conceived as a covert operation that could plausibly be denied, it still had to be noticeable and somewhat demonstrative. This was necessary in order to have a psychological effect on other Hamas leaders, i.e. in order to influence their behaviour.<sup>13</sup>

An example of the second approach can also be found in the already mentioned Arthashastra:

*If the son of a hostile sovereign lives near [the capital] or in a fortification, then he should be processed as a spy as follows: “You are the son of a sovereign, the most gifted with personal qualities ... Despite this, you are out of favour. What are you waiting for? Rise and seize [power] before the heir ruins you”.*<sup>14</sup>

As you can see, such actions are an attempt to facilitate the creation of a group struggling for power within an opposing state. Internal contradictions and the struggle for power can not only weaken the opposing state, but the result of such a struggle can be the coming to power of a loyal political elite, which will provide the necessary solutions and, accordingly, lead to a change in the behaviour of the state.

In 1917, at the height of the First World War, German military intelligence ensured unhindered passage through German-controlled territory for Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), the leader of the Bolshevik Party of Russia, and a group of his supporters. The calculation was that in Russia, the enemy state of Germany, the Bolshevik party, led by Lenin and opposed to the Russian government at that time, would intensify its struggle for power, which as in the previ-

<sup>12</sup> Struve VV, Larin VA, Kalianov VI and Baikov IP (eds.) (1959): Arthashastra Or the Science of Politics. Translation From Sanskrit. Moscow-Leningrad: The USSR Academy of Sciences 430-431.

<sup>13</sup> Mainichi daily news (Tokyo) (2017): Former MOSSAD chief Yatomi recalls failed assassination attempt on HAMAS head”. 18 August. Available at: <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170818/p2a/00m/0na/015000c>.

<sup>14</sup> Struve VV, Larin VA, Kalianov VI and Baikov IP (eds.) (1959): Arthashastra Or the Science of Politics. Translation From Sanskrit. Moscow-Leningrad: The USSR Academy of Sciences 443.

ous example, would lead to the weakening of Russia and its defeat or its conscious withdrawal from the war in the event of the Bolshevik Party coming to power. A few months after the arrival of Lenin and his supporters, the revolution broke out in Russia and the Bolsheviks came to power, the next year the Soviet government, led by Lenin, concluded a peace treaty with Germany. In turn, already in 1923, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in every possible way contributed to attempts to organize a socialist revolution in Germany. One of the decisions taken to support the revolutionary forces by the leadership of the Russian Communist Bolshevik Party was to send wheat for human consumption to Germany to support the main revolutionary force – the German workers. At the same time, such deliveries were to be carried out under the guise of ordinary commercial operations, for which special cover organizations were supposed to create over which proxies would exercise control.<sup>15</sup>

Another example of the support of a political force within another state in order to influence its behaviour is the support by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the participation in the elections of one of the political parties of Italy – Christian Democrats in 1972 (Latham 1978).<sup>16</sup>

In 2016, the Russian Federation carried out a series of covert intelligence operations aimed at influencing the US population in order to ‘undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency’.<sup>17</sup> A series of covert operations included cyber operations to steal sensitive information for Secretary Clinton, make it public through third parties and conduct discrediting campaigns against her based on this information. Such actions by Russian intelligence were carried out on the assumption that another candidate, Donald Trump, would be a more acceptable US president for Russia, and this does not mean that such operations were carried out by agreement or in cooperation with him. In this case, the influence was carried out on the basis of a comparative assessment of the two candidates and the choice of who would be more ‘convenient’ for the Russian Federation as president of the United States.

Separately, it is necessary to mention the intelligence support of opposition forces or groups that are waging an armed struggle against the government of another state. There are different points of view on this score. For example, one may consider this to be the use of a

<sup>15</sup> Prokhorov D (2005): *Razvedka Ot Stalina Do Putina* [Intelligence from Stalin to Putin]. St. Petersburg: Neva 369-372.

<sup>16</sup> Latham A (1976): *The CIA report the president doesn't want you to read*. The Village Voice. 6 February. Available at: <https://www.villagevoice.com/1976/02/16/the-cia-report-the-president-doesnt-want-you-to-read/>.

<sup>17</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2017): *Background To “Assessing Russian activities and intentions in recent US elections”*: The analytic process and cyber incident attribution. 6 January. Washington, DC: ODNI. Available at: [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA\\_2017\\_01.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).



military instrument of state power. However, if such support is carried out by the intelligence in accordance with the principle of plausible deniability and does not include direct participation in hostilities of military personnel, then this is still the use of an intelligence instrument. In such cases, the position of some countries, for example, the United States, is logical, when it is the civilian intelligence agency, and not the military one, which is part of the armed forces, that is responsible for conducting paramilitary operations.

The essence of the third approach is to influence a significant part of the population, broad groups of people or groups, although not numerous, but active and influential. The main difference from the first and second approaches is that it does not imply the existence of an agreement and cooperation with political actors in power or claiming to be. Thus, if the third approach turns out to be successful, then the necessary idea, the general atmosphere of the need to make certain state decisions becomes dominant in society and will influence the behaviour of any politician or state body. Here, the influence is carried out not on political leaders, but on the leaders of various groups outside the political spectrum, for example: religious figures, leaders of public organizations of various directions, for example, environmental, cultural and art workers, including pop culture, etc. It is also possible to directly influence group members or even the entire population, including through social - and traditional media. A pioneer in the sphere of public relation Edward Bernays noted: 'So vast are the numbers of minds which can be regimented, and so tenacious are they when regimented, that a group at times offers an irresistible pressure before which legislators, editors, and teachers are helpless'.<sup>18</sup>

Incidentally, the knowledge and skills of Edward Bernays in the field of influencing groups of people were in demand during the change of the ruling regime in Guatemala in 1954, which occurred as a result of the clandestine operation by the Central Intelligence Agency, codenamed 'PBSUCCESS'.

At the time of confrontation between the two poles in a bipolar system, Soviet foreign intelligence considered as a separate direction of its activity the influencing of broad masses of the population of a target country, as well as its individual, but rather large groups. The operations carried out by Soviet foreign intelligence were called 'active measures'. In 1992, one of the foreign intelligence officers of the Soviet Union handed over to the British authorities his archive, which contained, among other things, information about the essence of active measures. By active measures, Soviet foreign intelligence understood 'measures aimed at exerting useful influence on aspects of the political life of a target country which are of interest, its foreign policy, the solution of international problems, misleading the adversary,

<sup>18</sup> Bernays EL (1928): Propaganda. New York: Horace Liveright 25.

undermining and weakening his positions, the disruption of his hostile plans, and the achievement of other aims'.<sup>19</sup>

There also indicated the main methods of conducting active measures, indicating the use of the third approach, among which 'inspiring public speeches, press conferences, the publication of articles in newspapers and periodicals, the publication of books, the preparation and dissemination of leaflets, the passing of slanted information and disinformation to circles of interest to Intelligence, the organisation of public meetings and demonstrations'.<sup>20</sup>

### **Intelligence bodies and their place in the system of state bodies**

The use of an intelligence instrument of power by a state means that, in order to influence the behaviour of another state or non-state actor to achieve a desired result, it instructs its organs to take certain actions in such a way that its role could be completely hidden or plausibly denied. Based on this, we can distinguish four main elements that are the main defining characteristics of the intelligence instrument of power of the state: 1) the purpose of using the intelligence instrument of power is to influence the behaviour of another state or non-state actor; 2) such an instrument of power is used by the decision of the highest bodies, officials or political leaders of a state, acting on behalf of the state; 3) actions to achieve the required result are performed by other state bodies<sup>21</sup> at the direction of those referred to in the previous paragraph; 4) the actions taken should be carried out in compliance with the principles of complete concealment or plausible deniability of the role of the state using the intelligence instrument.

In the previous part of this article, we mentioned several examples from the ancient Indian treatise Arthashastra, which illustrated intelligence activities. However, at the time of the compilation of this treatise, there were no special independent bodies for the implementation of activities, which are now commonly called intelligence. Moreover, the rather widely used phrase 'intelligence activities' is mainly used in the meaning activities of the intelligence agencies, i.e., does not reveal the content of the activity itself, but only indicates the subject of its implementation – the organization, which in the modern world is usually called intelligence. Note that intelligence, as organs of a state with a corresponding name, appeared relatively recently – in the last century, whilst states arose several thousand years ago. From the very moment of the emergence of states, they have used instruments of power, the four main characteristics of which we indicated earlier. Thus, it is the substantive charac-

<sup>19</sup> Mitrokhin VN (2002): KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer's Handbook. Abingdon: Frank Cass 13.

<sup>20</sup> Mitrokhin VN (2002): KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer's Handbook. Abingdon: Frank Cass 141.

<sup>21</sup> Actions can be performed both directly by state bodies, but also on their instructions and under their guidance - by third parties.

teristics of the activity that mainly distinguish the intelligence instrument from other instruments of power.

A real example of the fact that the intelligence instrument was used by other bodies, and not only by the intelligence, even during its existence as a separate state body, is the activity of the executive bodies of the Communist International (Comintern). The Comintern was an organization that existed from 1919 to 1943, created with the aim of spreading communism and its victory throughout the world, which in practice would mean the rise to power of communist parties in different countries and the subsequent implementation of domestic and foreign policies in line with communist ideology. The Comintern included communist parties and organizations from different states, but it was created and ruled by the USSR and the functioning of all its organs was under the full control of the Soviet Union. Since the task of the Comintern and its constituent political actors – the communist parties – was the rise to power in their respective countries with the support of the USSR, then from the very beginning there was a question about the hidden nature of this type of activity. In the Executive Committee of the Comintern, a special department was formed, known as the Foreign Relations Department (FRD). This department, being in the USSR, had representations, so-called points, on the territory of other states. The Foreign Relations Department clandestinely organized contacts between the leaders and functionaries of foreign communist parties both with the bodies of the Comintern and among themselves, ensured their arrival in the USSR for meetings of the Congresses of the Comintern, forging documents for these purposes. All this required secrecy and conspiracy, because many of the communist leaders were persecuted in their countries. The FRD also organized funding for Communist Parties abroad and helped organize and implement communist propaganda. Thus, the activities of the Foreign Relations Department of the Comintern corresponded to all four elements that define an intelligence instrument of power, while the department was not an intelligence agency of the state.

If from the same point of view, we take another look at paramilitary operations then even in the case when they are carried out by special units of the armed forces, while meeting all four characteristics that we outlined earlier, it will still be the use of an intelligence instrument of power. The use of special units of the armed forces in this case does not turn the intelligence instrument into a military one. Also, for example, the use of armed forces to maintain law and order to assist the police does not mean that a law enforcement activity immediately turned into a military operation. The armed forces in many countries are involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance in case of natural disasters, yet in this case we can hardly claim the use of a military instrument of state power.

In the overwhelming number of states of our time, intelligence activity is legally separated from other types of activity, it is carried out by bodies specially created for this purpose, although, as we have already indicated above, this was not always the case. The position in the system of state bodies differs from country to country. For some, this may serve

as a basis for considering intelligence as an additional, auxiliary element of other instruments of state power, most often military or diplomatic, although this is not true.

For example, the UK's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI6 dates back to 1909. Then a special body of the government of Great Britain and the British Empire, the Committee of Imperial Defence, created the Secret Service Bureau, in which there was a Foreign Section. SIS is accountable to the government of the day, who set [its] priorities. The Prime Minister has overall responsibility for intelligence and security matters, however day-to-day ministerial responsibility for SIS lies with the Foreign Secretary (SIS, n.d.). The latter circumstance does not make Britain's foreign intelligence service a subsidiary organ of that country's foreign policy department, but a member of the government concerned acting within the established restrictions on behalf of governments as a whole. This ensures interaction between the elected political elite and professional officials – leaders of intelligence. However, the goals, objectives and priorities of foreign intelligence activities are determined by the government in accordance with the national interests of the country. In addition, the methods and means of intelligence activities of the second type differ from the traditional activities of diplomatic departments.

In some states, for example the United States, where there are 18 intelligence agencies, there is an intelligence agency that is part of the US Department of State – The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which is engaged in intelligence activities of the first type. This can really be seen as an auxiliary activity that allows for more effective use of diplomatic and other instruments of state power.

Since we already mentioned the United States, we note that the INR, a Bureau of the Department of State, mentioned above is a descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was created during World War II as an organ of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Along with the INR, the Office of Strategic Services is also the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, created in 1947 as an independent body. The Central Intelligence Agency is the only intelligence agency authorized to conduct covert operations at the direction of the President of the United States. U.S. law contains the term 'covert actions', that means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly (National Security Act of 1947). Thus, the place that the Office of Strategic Services occupied in the structure of state bodies was revised for its successors. The current position of one of them – the Central Intelligence Agency – in particular, the sphere of its powers and place in the system of state bodies, unequivocally indicates that an intelligence instrument is an independent instrument of state power.

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service traces its history back to 1920, from the creation of the Foreign Department of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combat-

ing Counterrevolution and Sabotage (VChK), created in turn under the Russian government almost immediately after the 1917 revolution. The VChK itself was a state security body and it was this place – within the state security bodies – that Russian foreign intelligence occupied until 1991, when it became an independent body of the state. The place in the system of state security bodies left its mark on the activities of intelligence. Much attention was paid to operations against opponents of Soviet regime in Russia and representatives of nationalist forces fighting for secession from the USSR. There are widely known cases of assassinations organized by Soviet intelligence abroad: Leon Trotsky, a prominent Russian communist leader and opponent of Joseph Stalin, in Mexico in 1940; Yevhen Konovalts, a supporter of Ukrainian independence, in the Netherlands in 1938; Stepan Bandera, also a supporter of Ukrainian independence, in Germany in 1959. Despite being inside the state security agencies, foreign intelligence has always occupied a special place there and has always been the main, and first in number, department, which, according to the traditions prevailing at that time, reflected its special and significant role. In 1947, in the USSR, there was an attempt to combine the foreign intelligence of the security agencies, military intelligence and other quasi-intelligence agencies into a single Information Committee under the government of the USSR, but this experiment failed and soon everything returned to its original position. The political tasks of the Information Committee, emanating from the highest bodies of the state when creating this body, were seen as follows: ‘To tear off the masks from the anti-Soviet activities of foreign circles, to influence public opinion in other countries, to compromise anti- Soviet politicians in foreign governments’.<sup>22</sup> The foreign intelligence of modern Russia, being a separate state body, is under the general leadership of the President of Russia, who defines its tasks, and also controls and coordinates its activities.<sup>23</sup> As can be seen from the examples, the place of foreign intelligence in the system of state authorities, its role, powers and nature of its activities indicate that the intelligence instrument of the state is an independent instrument of power.

### **Some features of the use of intelligence in various international political systems**

In international relations, the power of states is an important characteristic. In fact, the number of so-called poles, or Great Powers, qualitatively and substantially changes the system of international politics, which is ‘decentralized and anarchic’.<sup>24</sup> The presence of one, two or more poles change the properties of the system, which, in turn, has a different effect on the behaviour of both the poles themselves and other states.

<sup>22</sup> Prokhorov D (2005): *Razvedka Ot Stalina Do Putina [Intelligence from Stalin to Putin]*. St. Petersburg: Neva 243

<sup>23</sup> Federal Law of the Russian Federation On Foreign Intelligence (1995). November 2020. Moscow: Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/8732>.

<sup>24</sup> Waltz KN (1979): *Theory Of International Politics*. Berkeley: Addison- Wesley Publishing Company.

States choose different forms, methods and modes of behaviour under the influence of the current international political system. At the same time, all states act guided, first of all, by their national interests, the main ones of which are to ensure security and achieve prosperity.<sup>25</sup>

The balance of power is a well-known theoretical concept that has become part of the vocabulary of politicians. In this context, we will use the phrase 'balance of power' to mean equality of power between states.<sup>26</sup> For a state that, being a pole, significantly surpasses most other states in power, the main object of observation is a state equal to it in power or several states. The balance of power is seen as a safety factor. A change in the balance in favour of another state, real or imagined, is viewed as a potential threat to its own national interests.<sup>27</sup> If the rival state reveals an intention to take advantage of the imbalance that has arisen in its favour, and in fact – a preponderance in power, then a potential threat will become a real one.

When speaking about the balance of power as a characteristic of states in the international political system, two important aspects should be noted. Firstly, the poles, being approximately equal in power, have a different spatial distribution of their practical capabilities to use certain instruments of power in different parts of the world or in relation to other states. This significantly increases the time between the start of using a particular instrument and the achievement of the planned result. In other words, states can very quickly use some instruments of power in one case, and are unable to quickly perform similar actions in other cases. For example, it is quite logical and predictable that a state has a greater capability to use a military instrument of power in relation to another state with which it has a common border than to a state located on another continent. The possibility and effectiveness of using an intelligence instrument of power often strongly depends on the existence of common historical, cultural, religious, national and other ties between states. Secondly, the capability of Great Powers to use various instruments of power in some parts of the world may be even lower than that of some regional powers.

As noted earlier, the properties of various international political systems differ depending on the number of poles in it. Kenneth Waltz points out the defining difference between bipolar and multipolar systems, which is that

<sup>25</sup> The prosperity of democratically organized states is seen as a national interest for any of the political elites at the head of the state. For authoritarian and dictatorial states, such a statement may not be true, since the ruling elites, acting on behalf of the state, can pass off the welfare of one particular group of people for the welfare of the entire society.

<sup>26</sup> Equality here should be understood as an approximately equal balance of power.

<sup>27</sup> A detailed consideration of the concept of 'security dilemma' is not the purpose of this article.

*Balancing is differently done in multi and bipolar systems... Where two powers contend, imbalances can be righted only by their internal efforts. With more than two, shifts in alignment provide an additional means of adjustment, adding flexibility to the system. This is a crucial difference between multi- and bipolar systems.<sup>29</sup>*

In both systems, bipolar and multipolar, poles must keep a close eye on other states of equal power. At the same time, they not only constantly try to assess the power of such states and compare it with their own, but also make attempts to find out about the intentions of other states. This is precisely one of the most important intelligence missions that can be accomplished by carrying out intelligence activities of the first type. In this case, intelligence as a separate auxiliary instrument, the use of which makes possible the use of another, in this case main, instrument. The role of intelligence can be compared to the role of a grindstone, without which a blunt knife becomes useless or difficult to use and an ineffective tool, unable to perform its function at all or properly. Intelligence can obtain and provide information necessary for the use of all instruments of power without exception. We also note that important information about the intentions of other states sometimes exists only in the heads of political leaders and state officials, without being present in any material form. In some cases, the role of intelligence can resemble the role of a fire alarm, which is triggered at the right, crucial moment, and allows firefighters to quickly get to the fire and extinguish it.

In a bipolar system, the detection of factors whose action can lead to a change in the balance of power unfavourable for one of the poles, as well as the establishment of the rival intentions to change the balance of power, leads to actions to implement internal balancing. In a bipolar system, it is extremely difficult to achieve a rapid change in the overall balance of power between poles in comparison, for example, with a tripolar system, where a simple bilateral alliance <sup>28</sup> of two against one will immediately lead to an imbalance. However, while maintaining the general balance of power, states can achieve a relatively rapid change in the balance of their capabilities to use certain instruments of power in certain regions of the world. A striking example of this development of a situation is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when, in response to the deployment of American ballistic missiles in Europe (Italy and Turkey), the Soviet Union secretly dispatched and deployed its ballistic missiles near North America (on the island of Cuba).

During the existence of the bipolar international political system that emerged after World War II and lasted until the end of the 1980s, the two superpowers, the USSR and the United States, used intelligence to assess each other's potentials. The presence/absence of nuclear parity, the balance of conventional weapons and the number of military units in gene-

<sup>28</sup> Waltz KN (1979): Theory Of International Politics. Berkeley: Addison- Wesley Publishing Company 163.

<sup>29</sup> By alliances here we mean alliances between Great Powers.

ral as well as in one or another region of the world, scientific discoveries and breakthrough technologies, the adversary's access to valuable limited resources, for example, oil, etc. – all this was of interest to intelligence, on the basis of such information, internal balancing was carried out. Such balancing in a bipolar world, as mentioned earlier, is carried out mainly by increasing the power of the state until it reaches a balance.

However, the equilibrium state can also change due to the weakening of one of the parties without changing the power of the other. Such a weakening – a decrease in power – can occur due to internal processes in the state. The choice of an instrument of power by the competent authorities of the state largely depends on the political, economic and social situation in it, and on public opinion on certain issues related to the use of such instruments. In addition, the soft power of a state, as understood by Joseph Nye,<sup>30</sup> diminishes significantly as its reputation deteriorates and respect for it is lost, often leading to a reluctance to cooperate on the part of other states. Here again we can look at the intelligence instrument of power in action.

The confrontation between the USSR and the United States was characterized by their support of opposition political and nationalist movements and attempts to influence public opinion in each other's camp, as well as attempts to influence public opinion within other states to harm the authority, image and reputation of the rival.

Since 1949, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began a series of covert operations, codenamed Project AERODYNAMIC and later Project QRPLUMB, in support of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, which continued until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991. The intelligence mission was to 'increase nationalist and other dissident tendencies in the Soviet Ukraine' with the aim of weakening the regime.<sup>31</sup> One of the CIA documents within Project AERODYNAMIC states this as follows:

*Nationalist flare-ups in widely scattered areas of the Soviet Union, and particularly those in the Ukraine, give evidence that the Soviet regime is experiencing problems in its endeavors toward complete cohesion of its people. It is considered opportune and important*

<sup>30</sup> Nye JS (2004) Soft Power. New York: Public Affairs.

<sup>31</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (2007) Research aid: cryptonyms and terms in declassified CIA files Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Disclosure Acts. CIA selected documents 1941-1948. June. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Available at: [https://ia801209.us.archive.org/6/items/AERODYNAMICVOL5DEVELOPMENTANDPLANS-0004/AERODYNAMIC%20%20%20VOL.%205%20%20%28DEVELOPMENT%20AND%20PLANS%29\\_0004.pdf](https://ia801209.us.archive.org/6/items/AERODYNAMICVOL5DEVELOPMENTANDPLANS-0004/AERODYNAMIC%20%20%20VOL.%205%20%20%28DEVELOPMENT%20AND%20PLANS%29_0004.pdf)



*to continue to encourage these divisive manifestations in the Ukrainian SSR.*<sup>32</sup>

In the mid-1980s of the twentieth century, the foreign intelligence of the security organs of the Soviet Union, together with the intelligence services of the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, carried out a series of active measures 'in connection with the emergence [...] of a new dangerous disease in the United States, the so-called "Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome – AIDS and its subsequent large-scale spread to other countries, including Western European"'.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, Soviet intelligence determined the purpose of its active measures 'to create abroad an opinion favourable to us [the USSR] that this disease is the result of secret experiments of the US special services and the Pentagon with a new type of biological weapon that have gone out of control'.<sup>34</sup> In this connection, the intelligence documents of the GDR mention the name of the corresponding operation – DENVER, and its goals 'to strengthen anti- American sentiments in the world and incite internal political contradictions in the United States'.<sup>35</sup>

In the above examples of the actions of the intelligence services of two poles, we see activities directed at weakening each other's state. The next example shows the use of an intelligence instrument by Great Powers against other states that are not included in that category, which are politically justified from the point of view of global rivalry between the two poles of the bipolar system.

<sup>32</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (2015): AERODYNAMIC VOL. 5 (DEVELOPMENT AND PLANS) 0004. Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group. San Francisco, CA: Internet Archive. Available at: [https://ia801302.us.archive.org/15/items/AERODYNAMICVOL5DEVELOPMENTANDPLANS-0004/AERODYNAMIC%20%20VOL.%205%20%28DEVELOPMENT%20AND%20PLANS%29\\_0004.pdf](https://ia801302.us.archive.org/15/items/AERODYNAMICVOL5DEVELOPMENTANDPLANS-0004/AERODYNAMIC%20%20VOL.%205%20%28DEVELOPMENT%20AND%20PLANS%29_0004.pdf).

<sup>33</sup> KGB (1985): Information nr.2955 [to Bulgarian State Security]". Record ID 208946. 7 September. Cold War International History Project. Washington, DC: Wilson Center Digital Archive. Available at: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208946>.

<sup>34</sup> Germany (East) Ministry for State Security (STASI) (1986): Plan for common and coordinated active measures of the intelligence organs of the MOI of the PR Bulgaria and the MFS of the GDR for 1987 and 1988. Record ID 208947. Cold War International History Project. 3 September. Washington, DC: Wilson Center Digital Archive. Available at: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208947>.

<sup>35</sup> KGB (1985): Information nr.2955 [to Bulgarian State Security]". Record ID 208946. 7 September. Cold War International History Project. Washington, DC: Wilson Center Digital Archive. Available at: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208946>.

In August 1953, a change in the ruling regime took place in Iran. Later, the US government recognized the active role of the Central Intelligence Agency in this, and then some of the relevant documents on the preparation and conduct of Operation AJAX (TPAJAX) were declassified and made public. Shortly before the change of regime, the CIA defined the US interest in Iran as follows:

*It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion. The loss of Iran by default or by Soviet intervention would: [...] d. Damage United States prestige in nearby countries [...] e. Set off a series of military, political and economic developments, the consequences of which would seriously endanger the security interests of the United States.*<sup>36</sup>

As we have already emphasized, in a multipolar world, the relationship between poles is extremely changeable, since the balance of power between them can be changed quite quickly by several of them through an alliance, i.e., external balancing. It is also possible to quickly balance the newly created alliance, in turn, only through reciprocal external balancing or destruction of the threatening alliance.

Let us consider the situation using the example of three states – A, B and C. Imagine that they all have the same power indicators equal to 1. If states B and C form an alliance with each other, then the aggregate power indicator of this alliance will be equal to 2, which is twice that of the power indicator of state A. To restore the balance of power, state A has little choice: (1) immediately double its power by internal balancing; (2) to destroy the alliance without creating any new ones, i.e., return the status quo that existed before the creation of the alliance; (3) to destroy the B&C alliance and form a new one – either with B or C. The first option can be considered to a greater extent as hypothetically possible, but hardly probable. It is almost impossible to quickly double your power, in addition in conditions of rivalry with an alliance that is twice as strong. It follows from this that the main aim of states in a multipolar world is the creation, strengthening (resistance to destruction) and the destruction of alliances. Accordingly, an intelligence instrument of power can be used by Great Powers for precisely these purposes and with the use of all three approaches we have outlined in this article earlier.

At the same time, in a multipolar political system, the important role of intelligence as a separate, auxiliary instrument necessary for the use of other instruments of state power remains. Flexibility in the formation of alliances on the part of Great Powers also implies some

<sup>36</sup> United States National Security Council (1952): Statement of policy proposed by the National Security Council. NSC 136/1. The present situation in Iran. 20 November. Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute US Department of State. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d147>.

difficulties in the choice of options for the behaviour of states with less power. They will be faced with a choice, for example, of whether they should follow the newly created alliance, bandwagoning, or wait for its destruction, or try to take an equidistant position from the rival poles, which is a somewhat difficult task and can pose a double risk to the security of such states. Ensuring a balanced global distribution of opportunities to use various instruments of state power, including intelligence, becomes even more important. Note also that the regional or sub-regional balance can easily be changed by creating a flexible alliance of a lower level with one of the regional powers or even non-state actors, which also requires the rival state to act accordingly.

In times of flexible international alliances, the line between allies and enemies is very conditional, the resources of states are, as always, limited, and therefore it is rather difficult to determine priorities in the distribution of their capabilities for the use of any, including intelligence, instrument of power in different regions of the world. These can be clandestine assets in various areas of interest, potentially important states, in particular in their political, economic, religious, informational, military and other spheres. The acquisition and creation of such assets takes both time and resources. Intelligence agencies of even the most powerful states in the world do not always have sufficient assets in a particular region of the world or state, therefore setting the right priorities, strategic planning and resource support are important components of success in using an intelligence instrument of power.

When it comes to flexibility in the creation of international alliances, it is quite reasonable to question the fate of such rigid defence alliances as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is without doubt an alliance in which the main role has always belonged to one of the poles – the United States of America. In the bipolar world, the role of NATO was obvious – the European states, having chosen the path of democratic development, at the same time chose for themselves a policy of ensuring their military security by following one of the two poles – the United States, which shares the same ideological values. A multipolar world, with its inherent flexibility in the behaviour of Great Powers, affects the state of hard alliances. Such alliances are characterized by political inertia in decision-making, which conflicts with the properties of the political system. Therefore, when quick action is required to solve certain security problems, members of hard alliances can, even contrary to the opinion of the majority, create flexible ad hoc alliances with other great or regional powers. From 2019 to this day, serious disagreements have lasted between Turkey and its NATO allies, including the United States. The main point of the disagreement is that the allies do not approve of Turkey's purchase of air defence assets from Russia, which is considered a likely enemy of the alliance. According to the rest of the organization, the deployment of such assets and their operation will create the danger that Russia may receive sensitive data on new military aircraft that will go into service with allies in Europe. Turkey, driven primarily by national interests, considers it necessary to pursue its own policy to ensure its security.

Military-technical cooperation between states is an important element in building up military power. By its nature, it is very similar to external balancing, when states seek to increase their military power at the expense of friendly or allied states, thereby changing the balance of power with their real or potential adversaries. At the same time, military-technical cooperation is largely closed to outside parties due to its specificity. In such conditions, it is intelligence that is capable of obtaining reliable information about the presence and content of military-technical cooperation between states. An intelligence instrument of power can be effectively used by states in order to destroy, prevent and discredit military-technical cooperation of other states in those cases if it poses a threat to the national security of the former.

The variability in the formation of alliances inherent in a multipolar world also affects cooperation between intelligence agencies of different states. In a period of tough alliances, adversaries and allies are clearly defined, in this sense it is easier for intelligence agencies to plan and coordinate their actions, taking into account their assets in a particular country. In conditions when alliances can be created and destroyed somewhat quickly, any current ally, in one way or another, should be considered as a potential adversary, and vice versa – the adversary can also quickly become an ally. First, it affects the processes of long-term and medium-term planning of intelligence activities, which in such conditions is extremely difficult to do both for a single state and for two or more states. The specificity of the activities of intelligence agencies is such that complex, covert and long-term preparation is required for their successful activity in a foreign country. Of course, it is much easier for Great powers than for others to have such assets in all regions of the world, but even for them to have sufficient and high-quality assets in each state is an impossible task. Secondly, cooperation between the intelligence services of two states in the joint implementation of activities in relation to a third presupposes a certain level of trust, the exchange of sensitive information, a certain awareness of each other's assets, and sometimes the joint use of assets when conducting separate or even a series of influence operations. Imagine that at some point an alliance of states that previously conducted joint intelligence activities collapsed, and the state whose behaviour they intended to influence entered into an alliance with one of its former adversaries. In this case, all plans, assets, methods, etc. will be compromised. All of the above gives us grounds to assert that in a multipolar political system, international intelligence cooperation does not have the depth and trust that can be considered in a bipolar system.

### **The use of an intelligence instrument of power by states in the context of a global collective security system**

The collective security system, created on the basis of the UN Charter, has repeatedly failed during the existence of the bipolar system. To confirm this, it is enough just to recall the Korean, Vietnam and Afghan wars, in which one or the other role of both poles was clearly

visible.<sup>36</sup> Both the USSR and the United States were permanent members of the UN Security Council – the main body in the global system of collective security, but both this body and the entire system became powerless as soon as the matter concerned the priority interests of the Great Powers.

In a multipolar world with several Great Powers in the UN Security Council with veto rights, the collective security system created on the basis of this organization's charter looks even less effective. If the UN Security Council includes poles, then this body for them is only one of the forms of their diplomatic communication, albeit with the participation of other states, and the enshrined right of veto of Great Powers to any decisions of this body reflects their inherent real influence in the international political system.

The UN Charter directly contains a ban on the conduct of interstate conflicts, except in cases of repulsing aggression. Any use of military force by any state without the approval of the UN Security Council will lead to negative consequences. In relation to a state that has violated the UN charter, the Security Council may apply measures of an economic or even military nature, but this is impossible in relation to a state that is not only a pole, but also a permanent member of this body.

Nevertheless, if a Great Power uses force against another state with less power other states can act outside the framework of the collective security system formed on the basis of the UN charter. They can, for example, apply sanctions and other restrictive economic measures against the violating state, refusing various forms of cooperation with it, as well as applying diplomatic measures. In addition, we have already mentioned the negative consequences of the loss of authority, respect and deterioration of reputation in the event that any state commits actions in the international arena that are unacceptable to most states.

Taking into account the possible negative consequences, Great Power still try to avoid using military instrument of power, although their motivations for this may be different. And here many of them again turn their gaze to intelligence instrument of power. After all, they are well suited to not formally crossing the line between war and peace, and to avoid accusations of interference in the affairs of another state. The point is that only an intelligence instrument can be used in such a way as to plausibly deny its participation in influencing another state. Intelligence activities of the second type are always carried out concealingly. The use of a military instrument of power by a state is always open and explicit. This is also true for other instruments of power, except intelligence one. For example, the state cannot apply economic sanctions secretly, because all national business entities must know about them in order to

<sup>36</sup> The legitimacy of interests, and their commonality with the interests of other states is not the subject of this article.

comply with the relevant government prohibitions on doing business with those to whom such sanctions are applied. Intelligence, as an instrument of power, on the contrary, can be used when the use of other instruments is impossible or extremely difficult for various reasons.

With the skillful use of an intelligence instrument, its result is noticeable to everyone, but how such a result was achieved can only be guessed at. It is also very difficult to find direct evidence of intelligence activities, which makes it possible to plausibly deny involvement by the state that used the intelligence instrument, even if the desired result is not achieved.

### **Conclusions:**

The intelligence instrument of state power is a separate instrument of international politics and can be used both independently and in combination with other instruments to defend and promote the state's national interests.

The international political system has a significant impact on the choice of goals and priorities for the use of an intelligence instrument of power, and also affects the processes within the intelligence agencies themselves. But, at the same time, the very essence of the intelligence instrument of power and its distinctive features remain unchanged in both bipolar and multipolar systems.

Effective, efficient and meaningful intelligence activities today require a separate, modern, well organised and skillful intelligence – agency or community. The development of the intelligence art is impossible without a separate institution that ensures the accumulation of its own experience, the development of new methods of using the intelligence instrument of power, as well as the study of the experience of other states in the application of such an instrument in international politics.

The peculiarities of the intelligence instrument of power make it possible to use it to bypass collective security systems like the UN, contrary to their principles and goals.

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## **РОЗВІДКА ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ ДЕРЖАВНОЇ ВЛАДИ ТА ЇЇ ВИКОРИСТАННЯ В МІЖНАРОДНІЙ ПОЛІТИЦІ**

*У статті зроблено спробу теоретично обґрунтувати, чому розвідка є самостійним інструментом сили держави, її спільні та відмінні риси з іншими інструментами сили держави. В роботі також наводяться історичні приклади*

*використання розвідки різними державами для впливу на поведінку інших держав, а також різні підходи, які при цьому використовувалися.*

*Деякі особливості використання державами розвідувального інструменту сили в умовах існування біполярної та багатополлярної політичних систем також висвітлюються в статті. Окрім того, звертається увага на стимули вибору розвідки як альтернативи іншим інструментам сил у держави в умовах обмежувального впливу глобальних систем розвідки як альтернативи іншим інструментам сили держави в умовах обмежувального впливу глобальних систем колективної безпеки, зокрема Організації Об'єднаних Націй.*

#### **Ключові слова**

*Зовнішня політика, інтелект, інструменти впливу, баланс впливу, безпека, конфлікт*